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## NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Question of UNSG: Working luncheon with the Permanent Representative of the USSR, H.E. Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky on Tuesday, 21 October 1980 at the Soviet Mission, 136E 67th St.

Today, I attended a luncheon at the Soviet Mission at the invitation of the Soviet Permanent Representative, Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky. The luncheon was only for the two of us and was held in one of the lounges of the Soviet Mission.

It is noteworthy to recapitulate the background to this luncheon. For almost three weeks now, the Soviet Ambassador had been telling me that he wanted to have a meeting with me to exchange views on certain things and more particularly soon after the publication of the article in Newsweek\* concerning the alleged Soviet position on my possible candidature for the UNSG Ambassador Troyanovsky kept reminding me whenever we met at the United Nations about the need to get together.

Last Friday, 17 October, Ambassador Troyanovsky called and suggested that we have lunch sometime this week at his mission. I concurred and today's date was mutually agreed.

As already stated, the luncheon was confined to the two of us and it soon became obvious that the main purpose of the lunch was to provide an opportunity for Ambassador Troyanovsky to give me his own comments concerning

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\* Newsweek of 6 October 1980 under the section 'Periscope' at page 27 had the following - "ANOTHER TERM FOR WALDHEIM? Kurt Waldheim seems headed for another term as U.N. Secretary-General. The reason, say U.N. Sources, is that the diplomat whom many countries favour to succeed him - Tanzanian Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim - is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. When Waldheim was elected to his second term in 1976, it was widely expected that in 1981 an African would be chosen Secretary-General. Most U.N. hands have high regard for the 39 year old Salim, but the Soviets see him as too independent - and they are worried because Tanzania is friendly with China. The likely result: at election time next year Waldheim will be picked if he clearly signals that he wants to remain."

the rumors which have been circulating (and reported by Newsweek) to the effect that the Soviet Union would possibly block my candidature.

But first we discussed various issues, including developments on the Iran/Iraq war, the question of Afghanistan (on which Ambassador Troyanovsky expressed 'surprise' at Tanzania's position, pointing out that he had thought and hoped that Tanzania would have adopted a similar stance like the rest of the Frontline States in the Sixth Emergency Special Session, i.e. either voting against the resolution or abstaining) and the resolution on Kampuchea. Later on we discussed the developments on Namibia with particular reference to the present visit of the Secretary-General's team to South Africa. But as stated, the main thrust of the conversation was the question of the Secretary-Generalship.

Alluding to this point, Ambassador Troyanovsky stated that he wanted me to know that there was no truth in the reports that the Soviet Union was working against my candidature. "We have not made our position yet and I know of no official, either here in our mission or at home, who has expressed any position one way or the other on this question. I thought therefore you should know that there is no validity to the claims that we are working against your candidature." Ambassador Troyanovsky then went on to say that having made this point he would want me also to know that he would not be surprised if his people in Moscow would go along in support of Secretary-General Waldheim if he should seek another term. He believed that the rumors concerning the so-called Soviet opposition to my candidature must have been started by some Western countries, possibly even France. He reiterated that his Government has not made up its position and he went on to state that he felt I should continue with my campaign. He stated that even if I did not make it in the coming elections,

I would have established myself as a viable and logical successor to the present incumbent.

Ambassador Troyanovsky went on to say that the approach which might be taken by his Government would be that of "a person who has had a pair of shoes for some time; they are comfortable and despite some irritations there is no reason to change them." This is how he rationalized the possible inclination of Moscow to prefer the status quo.

Ambassador Troyanovsky also stated that he had heard that the Director-General, Mr. Ken Dadzie, was interested in contesting the post. He had heard so from at least one African delegation (which he did not identify). He went on to say that he was surprised when he heard this because on the basis of competence and judging by his record, he did not think that Ken Dadzie would be suitable as a candidate. Ambassador Troyanovsky seemed to imply his concurrence with those who have been disappointed and critical of Ken in the performance of his functions as Director-General.

I told Ambassador Troyanovsky that I was very grateful for his remarks. I particularly appreciated that his Government had made no position. I was also appreciative of his disclaimer of the rumors about his Government being opposed to my possible candidature. I assured him that when I read the story in Newsweek and heard some of the rumors that had been circulating in that vein, I personally did not believe them and attached no importance to them. At any rate, it was certainly more reassuring to have heard his explanation.

In the course of the luncheon I asked Ambassador Troyanovsky whether they had been approached by the Secretary-General indicating that he wanted a third term. To this the Soviet Envoy replied that no such approach has been made, but it was quite evident that the Secretary-General was working for another term.

Both Ambassador Troyanovsky and I agreed that there is a long way to go before the elections next year and that much will depend on how things develop. I told him that a number of African and non-African colleagues have made definitive approaches asking me to present my candidature and I was sure that in the same spirit many countries would be contacted, including his own. Ambassador Troyanovsky reaffirmed what he stated earlier, that he felt that I should continue with my campaign.

At a later stage during the luncheon and before I left the Soviet Mission, I again pointedly remarked that I was appreciative of the fact that the Soviets were not opposed to my candidature but rather they would go along with the incumbent if he desires to seek another term. Ambassador Troyanovsky responded, "Yes, it is not a question of opposition to your candidature. It is a question of preference over any change," meaning that from their point of view the status quo was acceptable.

The working luncheon which began at about 1:20 p.m. ended at 2:25 p.m. in a very amicable spirit and we agreed to keep each other informed of developments concerning this question.

#### OBSERVATIONS:

From the discussion with Ambassador Troyanovsky a number of things were clear to me. These include:-

- (a) That he was anxious to assure me of the non-validity of the rumors and reports to the effect that my candidature would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union;
- (b) At the same time however, he wanted to affirm what has always been clear to me and to many others. This is that if it came to preference, they would prefer the status quo;

- (c) The fact that he kept reiterating that I should continue with the campaign would tend to confirm that as a matter of principle they have no opposition to my candidature as such but rather if circumstances allow they would like to continue "with the devil you know ..."

As I left the Soviet Ambassador, I formed a definitive impression that the Soviet's final position would clearly be determined by the type of support that my possible candidature would get from the rest of the general membership of the Organization and more specifically within the third world countries.

We have known all along that both Moscow and Washington would be the most conservative when it came to the elections. At the same time, they both, and perhaps more so Moscow, would prefer not to disturb the status quo. Clearly therefore if my candidature is to have a positive outcome, those who are committed to it - Africans and non-Africans - will have to work actively to universalize its support. More specifically, the strategy which has already been discussed with some friends of their approaching Moscow, would be equally important.

The most positive outcome of this luncheon was to get a categorical denial from Ambassador Troyanovsky that the Soviets were working against my candidature. Another positive aspect (though negative in concept) was the confirmation of what we already know, namely that if it came to a matter of simple choice, one could depend on the Soviet Union preferring the continuation of the mandate of the incumbent. And even though Ambassador Troyanovsky told me that the Secretary-General could not continue to be Secretary-General forever,

and stated that if he were to get another term that would be the last term, it is possible that without any pressure they would not be unhappy to continue with the status quo ad infinitum.

Here I am reminded of two conversations which took place in 1976 when Secretary-General Waldheim was campaigning for his second term. The first with with Dr. Waldheim himself in his office on the 38th floor. After I had assured him of our firm support for his re-election (Tanzania was in that year a member of the Security Council and hence we had a role in the Council concerning his re-election), the Secretary-General told me that nothing would please him more than to see me (and here he added all sorts of superlatives commending my role) take over from him when his term expires in 1981! I later learnt from Commonwealth Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal that Waldheim had made more or less similar remarks to him. At any rate what is important is that Waldheim had told us and a number of other colleagues that this was to be his last term. Yet here he is now campaigning for an unprecedented third term.

The second conversation (or to be accurate a second series of conversations) which I vividly remember was (were) with the then Deputy Permanent Representative and Acting Permanent Representative of the USSR, Ambassador Khamalov. (NB: The Permanent Representative of the USSR at the time was the late Ambassador Jacob Malik who died in Moscow earlier this year).

At a luncheon given by the Secretary-General for the Prime Minister of Seychelles, <sup>reunited</sup> Sir Ramgoolan (who was then the current Chairman of the OAU) during the early part of the General Assembly session in 1976, I was seated next to the Soviet Envoy. The latter then, without my asking anything, stated that he was confident that I would be elected as Secretary-General in the 1981

elections, And as if this was not enough, Ambassador Khamalov on two other occasions, pointedly repeated his assertion and claimed that he was not simply saying this to be nice. "We have discussed and analysed this in our Mission and you know we are quite serious in these matters", claimed Ambassador Khamalov, determined to convince me that they, the Soviets, have already projected about my candidature and as far as they were concerned my possible election was almost certain!

(NB: It should be noted that in 1976 my name had appeared in the press several times as a possible candidate for the elections that year. But all the press reports also had a common conclusion that I was young and could afford to wait for 1981).

New York , 21 October 1980  
SAS/amg