

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
TAKE HOME EXAM

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April 25, 1974

QUESTION 1: CHINESE STATEMENTS ON NEHRU (1949), (1959), AND (1962)

These Statements clearly reflect the turbulent nature of Sino-Indian relations with its conspicuous twists and turns. The "love-hate relationship"¹ between the two giant Asian nations is clearly perceived. The statements on Nehru also reveal the changing patterns of Chinese foreign policy, namely: from hard line to accommodation and then back to hard line approach coupled with confrontation.

(a) The labelling of Nehru as "a loyal slave of imperialism" in 1949 is in line with the "militant policy" of China after liberation when Peking regarded Nehru and other nationalist [bourgeoisie] leaders in Asia as "running dogs of imperialism" due partly to their declared stances of "neutrality". Peking's suspicion and denunciation of neutralism was reflected in Mao's assertion in 1949: 'Neutrality is a camouflage [for membership of the imperialist camp] and a third road does not exist'. And Liu Shao-chi put it equally bluntly: "So-called neutralism is nothing but deception, intentional or otherwise"². In 1948, in a message to Indian Communist Party leader Ranadive, Mao Tse-tung reportedly labelled Nehru by insinuation as collaborator of imperialism.³ Essentially, this 'one line' approach of the CCP under Mao Tse-tung's leadership was largely responsible for the abuses against Nehru. Also apparent was the fact that New Delhi's questioning of Peking's claim to suzerainty over Tibet exacerbated PRC suspicion. Nehru and his fellow colleagues were thus accused of emulating the imperialists and harbouring "beastly ambition" for aggressive intentions against Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan - Peking predicted for Nehru [Characterised as India's Chiang Kai-shek] "the same road to death".⁴

(b) The subsequent reference to Nehru as a friend must be viewed in its proper perspective. Despite Peking's out-burst against India's Prime Minister, Delhi recognized PRC on October 30, 1949 [the second non-communist country to do so] and Nehru spoke glowingly of the '2000 years of friendship' between the two countries. Between 1949 and 1959, a number of significant events took place. India's independent and mediatory role during the Korean war demonstrated to the PRC the fallacy of their assumptions about India's "neutralism" being camouflage alliance with western imperialism. When Chinese "volunteers" entered the Korean war India opposed the labelling of PRC as the aggressors though New Delhi had earlier in the Security Council joined in so labelling the DPRK. Chou En-lai visited India in 1954 and the era of panchsheel [five principles of peaceful co-existence] was proclaimed. With it, entered the short but significant period of Hindi-Chini Chini Bhai Bhai [Indian and Chinese are brothers]⁵. There was also the Bandung Conference of April 1955. India's refusal to join the military blocs of US imperialism was hailed by Peking. So was New Delhi's anti-colonialism posture and Nehru's policy of friendship towards China. PRC's friendly attitude towards India also followed her general policy in that period of normalizing relations with Asian countries. PRC's initial militant foreign policy of ideological puritanism [dogmatism?] turned gradually to a more "realistic, a more flexible and therefore rewarding position in Asia"⁶. Thus, at least temporarily, PRC discarded the policy of treating Nehru, and his other Asian colleagues as "the political garbage group in Asia".

(c) The last statement symbolised the complete reversal of Sino-Indian relations. At that point, the ties were at their lowest ebb following first the political and then the military confrontation

between the two States. The conflict over the Himalayan in October 1962 was a culmination of three years of serious political clashes as well as minor military incidents on the border. The border dispute came into the open in 1959 with first Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai in March 22 and the Chinese Prime Minister's reply on September 8. Furthermore, the "rebellion" in Tibet, the Chinese response to it, as well as India's sympathetic reaction to the 'cause' of the Tibetans and their reception of the Dalai-lama damaged "India-China relations beyond measure"⁷. That year witnessed a process of vitriolic recriminations between the two nations. Peking labelled Indian leaders as "expansionist, imperialist agents and reactionaries". Those attacked included Nehru's daughter [and now Prime Minister] Indira Gandhi. Yet, significantly, at that period Peking exercised restraint. Nehru was personally spared pursuant to the so called "dual tactic of struggle and compromise". This explains why such reference of Nehru being a friend and anti-imperialist [cf. question (b)] could be made in 1959 when relations between the States were rapidly going to the doldrums.

Chou En-lai's one week visit to Delhi in April 1960 and the border negotiations that ensued failed to achieve a settlement. The limited but costly [In terms of future ties between the two States] war erupted in the autumn of 1962.

QUESTION 2: CHINESE STATEMENTS ON THE UNITED NATIONS

PRC's interest in the United Nations was shown during the very early months of its founding. On November 15, 1949 and January 15, 1950, Chou En-lai had cabled the United Nations at Lake Success demanding the expulsion of the representatives of the "Kuomintang reactionary

clique". CCP had expected its regime to be the logical and undisputed successor of the China seat at the UN following the triumph of the Peoples Liberation Army forces over the Kuomintang in the mainland.

But this was not to be. Not at least for another twenty-one years. China's possibilities of early "restoration of its lawful rights" were seriously affected by the Korean war. The entry of PRC "volunteers" into the war on October 1950, brought her into sharp confrontation with both the United States and the "United Nations".

The 'deprivation' of her "lawful seat" brought considerable frustration in Peking. This frustration was at times manifested by outright denunciation of the organization; at other times by calls for its restructuring, and at still others by expression of satisfaction at the "irresistible" trends towards PRC's inevitable victory in "regaining" her seat.

(a) The 1963 statement referred to in the question reflects the atmosphere of conciliatory approach to the organization and a sense of optimism. It is relevant to recapitulate here that this statement was made during the so-called "Second Bandung period" when China projected an image of "moderation" and undertook efforts to maximise friends particularly among third world countries. Another point of interest here is the reference to the "preservation of the Charter". Indeed throughout the period of Peking's "alienation" from the United Nations she had never repudiated the Charter.

(b) China's demand for a thorough reorganization of the United Nations or even the setting up of a new "revolutionary U.N." made in 1965 can be viewed in at least three background perspectives. It was a manifestation of PRC's bitterness at the "injustice" which she continued to suffer at the hands of the "United States-manipulated"

world organization.

Secondly, this demand was made following the dramatic withdrawal from the United Nations in 1964 of Soekarno's Indonesia over her confrontation with Malaysia on the North Kalimantan issue. It was therefore a gesture of solidarity with the Bung who had, prior to his overthrowal that very year, moved much closer to Peking. In this respect, it is also pertinent to refer to the joint communique of Chou En-lai and Ayub Khan after the late Pakistani President's visit to China /March 2 - 9, 1965: "The two parties held that the United Nations should reorganize itself in order to reflect better the balance of forces in the world and present international realities".¹⁰

Finally, the statement must be viewed in the context of a hardening of Chinese foreign policy stances as a harbinger of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

(c) On October 25, 1971 in ^ascene filled with drama, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by a majority of 76 in favour; 35 opposed and 17 abstentions, a twenty-three power draft resolution [so called Albanian resolution] demanding the "restoration" of all the lawful rights of China" in the UN and the immediate expulsion of the representatives of "Chiang Kai-shek clique" from the UN and related organizations. By November 15, 1971, Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua was delivering PRC's first policy statement at the UN.

This 'entry' of PRC to the UN was triumphant culmination of a 'long march'. Official reaction of Peking described it as "the bankruptcy of the policy of depriving China of her legitimate rights in the U.N. obdurately pursued by U.S. imperialism over the past twenty years and more and of the U.S. imperialist scheme to create 'two Chinas' in the United Nations".¹²

FOOT NOTES

1. Patwant Singh, "India and China: The Continuing Confrontation" in INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, Fber and Faber, London, 1966, p.158.
2. As quoted in Allen S. Witting's CHINA CROSSES THE YALU, Standford University Press, Stanford, California, 1968, p.7.
3. Sudhakar Bhat, India and China, Published by Gulab Vazirani, New Delhi, 1967, p.10.
4. Singh, op.cit, p. 158.
5. During this 'honeymoon', Nehru visited China in October 1954 and Chou En-lai again visited Delhi in 1956. One of its early by-products was India's acceptance of Tibet as "The region of China".
6. V. P. Dutt, China's Foreign Policy 1958 - 1962, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1964, p. 148.
7. Ibid, p. 197.
8. For an interesting discussion on this, see Winberg Chai, "China and the United Nations! Problems of Representation and Alternatives" Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 5, May, 1970.
9. For full text of Chinese Statement see Peking Review, January 29, 1965, pp. 5 - 6.
10. Winberg Chai, (ed.), The Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, Capricorn Books, New York, 1972, p. 366.
11. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1965 - 1966, p. 20694.
12. Peking Review, November 5, 1971, p.6.