

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA:
THE CASE OF TANZANIA

Salim Ahmed Salim

Political Science S4600J
Professor G. W. Choudhury
School of International Affairs
Columbia University

Summer 1974

C O N T E N T S

I	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II	CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA: BACKGROUND.....	5
III	SINO-TANZANIAN RELATIONS: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE.....	13
IV	ON THE ROLE OF AID AND EXPERTS.....	22
	The TANZAM Railway.....	26
V	EXAMINING CHINESE AND TANZANIAN GOALS (OBJECTIVES).....	31
IV	CONCLUSION.....	37
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	40

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA:
THE CASE OF TANZANIA

INTRODUCTION

One of the clearly discernible factors in Chinese foreign policy and behaviour today is the importance and prominence that Peking attaches to her relations with the countries of the Third World. China considers itself an integral and inseparable part of the Third World. "Shih Chun", in Peking Review of June 1972 points out: "A knowledge of history enables us to realize profoundly that the Chinese people and the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are class brothers and comrade in arms who are closely linked as flesh and blood and share weal and woe and that China and the overwhelming majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries belong to the Third World".¹

Chinese spokesmen at the United Nations and other international fora repeatedly stress this identification with the Third World.² And as part of the exercise to "expose" Soviet "Social imperialism"³ and draw a clear distinction between China's link with the Third World as opposed to the "hegemonic ambitions" of the

-
1. 'SHIH CHUN', "Excerpts from why it is necessary to study World History and some History about Imperialism", reproduced in Milton, Schurman et al (eds.), PEOPLE'S CHINA, Social Experimentation; Politics, Entry onto World Science, 1966 through 1972, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, p.438.
 2. The once discredited (during the Cultural Revolution) and now fully "rehabilitated" Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping reiterated this point in his address on April 15, 1974 to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which was specially convened to discuss the problems of Raw Materials and Development. See A/PV.2209.
 3. For an interesting discussion on why China views the Soviet Union as a "Social imperialist" power, see Leninism or Social Imperialism? Pamphlet published by Foreign Language Press, Peking 1970. This article originally appeared in the People Daily of April 22, 1970.

Soviet Union and the United States, China takes pain to point out ad nauseam that "she is not and will never be a super power".⁴

This determined identification with the Third World would seem to serve at least two objectives for the communist elite in China. First, such a policy is in consonance with PRC's revolutionary policies of supporting the "oppressed peoples and nations". The so called North-South confrontation which is very much evident in the domain of international politics and much more so in the field of international economic relations, provides a fertile ground for China's supportive policies of "the oppressed and the exploited". And although Chinese leaders including Chou En-lai vigorously protest against any insinuations that Peking is trying to be the leader of the Third World or the Centre of World Revolution,⁵

-
4. Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in his first address to the UN General Assembly after PRC's admission in 1971 made this point. A/1983, pp.97-98. Premier Chou En-lai has also repeatedly stressed on this. And in an editorial entitled "Down with the Doctrine of Big-Nation Hegemony", Jen-min Jih-pao of January 23, 1971 declared: "China will never seek the so called big-power position. We will forever stand side by side with all nations subjected to aggression control, intervention, or subversion by super powers; we will forever stand side by side with all oppressed people and oppressed nations. The Chinese people will fight together with the people of the whole world to resolutely smash the doctrine of big-nation hegemony!" See. Winberg Chai, ed., The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Capricorn Books, New York, 1972, pp. 374-377.

In a report on the Revision of the Party Constitution, at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Wang Hung-wen declared on August 24, 1973, "We must persist in the principle "Never Seek Hegemony" and must never be a super power under any circumstances", The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents), Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1973, p. 56.

5. In his interview with a Mexican Journalist, Mr. Julio Scherer Garcia (Editor in Chief of the Journal - Excelsior) on September 6, 1971, Premier Chou En-lai, is reported to have categorically reiterated that "China has never had, nor has pretensions to turn herself into a centre of the world revolution". Milton, Schurman et al, op.cit., p.479

it is difficult not to conclude that Peking is determined to prove by actions and deeds that it is in Peking rather than in the Kremlin that the true spirit of revolution and international proletarianism abounds. This first objective of PRC can thus be described as the ideological one.

The second objective in some ways flows from the first one though it can essentially be conceived in terms of China's self interest. The solidarity with the Third World so generously displayed by the authorities in China, apart from being a logical phenomena arising from the ideological belief and commitment of the PRC leadership, is also part of the continuing struggle for influence and support between China and her main rival - the USSR. Indeed, with the worsening of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the stage was set for the intensification of Sino-Soviet competition vying for greater influence in the countries of the Third World. China considers the USSR not only as an arch ideological rival but above all as posing the most serious threat to her security. The need to cultivate and win more friends thus becomes important indeed. Because of "shared experiences" as former colonies or semi-colonies of the European imperialist powers, China considers the nations of the Third World as natural allies and has endeavoured to cultivate ties with them and win their understanding, if not sympathy. To achieve this goal, China makes full use of her considerable talent and resources.

For obvious reasons, as an Asian power, China can be expected to give the highest priority to Asia in its relations with the Third World Nations. This she, indeed has. But China's ties with the Asian Continent is a mixture of conflictual (as with the case of

India) and cooperative (as with Pakistan) interactions confirming Professor Yu's assertion that "cooperative interaction has been a dimension as important as conflict in Chinese Foreign policy and behaviour".⁶

Since when?
Among the continents of the Third World, Africa ranks immediately after Asia in China's foreign policy priorities. Indeed, Africa would appear to assume increasing importance among the Chinese policy planners and decision makers. The single most important project undertaken by China outside its own borders is to be found in Africa. This is the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (known as the TANZAM Railway).

This study will focus on the cooperative aspects of China's foreign policy. And in this connection, Africa more than Asia, provides us with safer grounds if only because conflictual patterns are not really manifested there. This is not to argue that things have been all that smooth in PRC's relations with Africa. There have been many incidents of differences as indeed conflicts in the narrow sense of the word. For example, Chinese diplomats accused of subversion, have been sent packing from a number of African capitals. But, these "conflicts" with certain African States have, by and large, been based on some misunderstanding and minor untoward incidents which have at times been magnified either by the tactless behaviour of Chinese officials themselves (as was the case during the cultural revolution)⁷ or deliberately inflated by the

6. Yu, George T., China and Tanzania; University of California, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1970

7. Coral Bell alludes to the ramifications of this tactless approach in his essay, "The Foreign Policy of China" reproduced in F.S. Northedge, The Foreign Policies of the Powers, Faber and Faber, London, 1969, pp.145-147.

African authorities for other reasons. These reasons included receptivity to instigation by the former metropolitan powers which considered the "penetration" of China as a possible threat to their vast interest. Essentially however, China's relations with Africa fall within the dimension of cooperative interaction.

In order to confine the study to manageable proportions, it is necessary to limit its scope. And thus the choice of Tanzania as a case study. Tanzania has been selected because Sino-Tanzania relations represent one of the best forms of PRC's cooperative interaction in Africa. With its strategic importance as a front line State (like Zambia) in the struggle between free Africa and that part of the Continent under white minority rule in Southern Africa and as a Headquarters of the Organization of African Unity's Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, Tanzania's relations with China has also certain continental implications. Thus, before the study focuses on Sino-Tanzanian ties, it would be appropriate to examine, however briefly, the background of China's links with Africa. Such an examination will help to put Sino-Tanzanian ties in their proper African perspective.

II

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA: BACKGROUND

The Director of the Institute of Archaeology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences writing in 1962 traced China's relations with Africa to 1700 years ago.⁸ Yet Sino-African ties in the contemporary

8. Yu, op.cit., p.30

epoch appear to be a very recent phenomena. One explanation that is attributed to the interruption of ties is the fact that both China and Africa were victims of Western colonialism and imperialism. Chinese leaders, including Chou En-lai have given credence to this argument and pointing out that the current Sino-African relations is the resumption of the process of cooperative interaction which the forces of colonialism and imperialism with its local accomplices had temporarily thwarted.⁹

The victory of the Communist Revolution in October 1949 and the emergence of the Peoples Republic of China brought into the international arena a completely New China. Quite clearly however, for some years Africa appeared nowhere among the priorities of the foreign policy makers in Peking. Most research on the subject point out the fact that relations between the new Communist regime in Peking and Africa commenced in earnest only after the Bandung Conference of April 1955.¹⁰

A number of possible explanations can be inferred to the "low profile" approach of the Chinese leadership's attitude towards Africa prior to Bandung. Immediately following the proclamation of the Peoples Republic, Peking had its own priorities in the domain of international relations. Her immediate pre-occupations were to promote and consolidate her ties with the Socialist countries. The second priority, was the relations with the Asian States, particularly

-
9. Premier Chou En-lai's address to a mass rally in Dar es Salaam in June 1965 during the Chinese leader's State Visit to Tanzania.
 10. Larkin makes the interesting observation that even at the Asia-African Conference at Bandung, China did not seem to attach any significant importance to Africa, "although Bandung marked the beginning of significant Chinese initiatives in Africa". Larkin, Bruce D., CHINA AND AFRICA, 1949 - 1970, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1971, p.19.

those bordering China. Yet, important as these factors were, they cannot be attributed to be the conclusive reasons behind New China's lack of contacts with Africa.

The "Great Wall" of separation imposed by Africa's colonial rulers to the communists of all persuasions should not be underestimated. And if dealing with the East Europeans was "unthinkable" on the part of the colonial peoples, contacts with the "red" Chinese was simply a matter beyond the possibilities of those Africans under colonial domination - with the exception of very few cases. This latter category comprised of those "stubborn agitators" who somehow managed to find their way to Peking at the risk of their own freedom on their return to their respective countries. Since the overwhelming majority of the African countries south of the Sahara were still under colonial domination at the time of Bandung, it is easy to understand the significance of this "barrier" imposed by Western colonialism. Many Africans therefore viewed China through the eyes of their imperial masters and the "spectre" of the "yellow peril" was deeply imbedded in many of them.

After Bandung, Peking gave increasing attention to Africa. This focus on the African continent was also in pursuance of Chairman Mao's general line of "East Wind" prevailing over the "West Wind".¹¹ China's active involvement in support of the African Liberation Movement for example, can be traced to her support of the Algerian National Liberation Front. This support was particularly vigorous from 1957 up to that country's independence in 1962. As Larkin

11. Vidya Prakash Dutt, CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1958-1962, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1964, p.19.

points out: "... the Algerian war was an important subject of Chinese policy. The FLN (National Liberation Front) sought aid from China and aid was granted. Moreover, after the FLN success, China cited the successful FLN guerilla struggle as an inspiration to the other colonial peoples".¹²

There is no doubt that the victory of the Algerian Liberation war had a tremendous impact on the African revolution. The inspiration from Algeria undoubtedly played an important part in the launching of guerilla warfare in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. China, having made some contribution to the Algerian war and political effort could clearly look back to her role there as a significant "plus" in her relations with Africa. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union, (which did not recognize the Provisional Algerian Government in exile), China accorded that Government early recognition. Moscow refrained from doing so until Algeria became formally independent. In the wake of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, China tried to use this factor to demonstrate her "impeccable" revolutionary credentials as opposed to the prevaricating nature of the Soviet "modern revisionist".¹³

As an important anecdote in reflecting on China's active involvement in African affairs, it may be observed that this new approach of the leadership in Peking coincided with the general trend of the People's Republic to be increasingly more assertive and affirmative in its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy.

Hitherto, China's foreign policy in general was closely linked with that of the Soviet Union.

12. Larkin, op.cit., p.272.

13. Dutt, op.cit., p.27

In the aftermath of Bandung, China's diplomatic and political offensive in Africa entailed both promotion of contacts and relations with free Africa wherever possible as also with a multitude of African Liberation movements. Perhaps the most significant institution through which this was made possible was the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Peking was not only a founding member of this organization, which, though not a direct by-product of the Bandung Conference, drew its inspiration from that first major conference of Asian and African leaders; China was in fact one of those countries instrumental in persuading President Nasser in hosting its first Conference in Cairo in 1958.¹⁴

The importance of AAPSO lay not only in the fact that it was the chief "institutional embodiment" of the Afro-Asian world, but above all in the nature and diversity of its members. This Organization was essentially a "people's movement". And it is through this institution in particular that China was also able to cultivate its relations with the African nationalist movements. Subsequent to the Sino-Soviet confrontation, China withdrew from AAPSO and the Organization has emerged as an important instrument of pro-Soviet policies.

As a former semi-colonial country which was exploited, oppressed, "ridiculed" and "humiliated", China's experience has a lot in common

14. Larkin, op.cit., p.33. Throughout the early 1960s China took an active part in the functioning of AAPSO to which she had a permanent Secretary in the Permanent Secretariat at the Organization's Headquarters in Cairo. China particularly was active in all the three major conferences held before the Sino-Soviet confrontation caused some havoc within the Organization leading to China's withdrawal in 1966. Peking attended the first and founding conference in 1958, the second conference in Conakry, Guinea in 1960 and the third held in Moshi, Tanzania in 1963.

with the African countries, both independent and dependent. Peking, in her relations with Africa has tended to make maximum use of this "shared experience" at the hands of the European colonial powers. At times she has also subtly used the racial factor to emphasize closer identification particularly in her attempt to "expose" Soviet "Social imperialism". Professor Dutt of the Indian School of International Studies asserts that "there is a strong admixture of racial appeal and advocacy of radical politics in Peking's policy towards Africa".¹⁵

Whether the Chinese leadership have deliberately sought to play up the sentiments of racial affinity even at the point of downgrading the ideological factor as their Soviet detractors tend at times to point out may be debatable. But what cannot be contested is the fact that China has at times referred to this element. Thus, for example, the Chairman of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Liao Cheng-chih in his address to the Second Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization declared:

"The Chinese people entertain specially close and warm feelings for the African people in their struggle against colonial rule and for national independence...We were also regarded by the imperialist aggressors as a so-called 'inferior race' and our people suffered the same bitterness of slaughter, plundering and enslavement at the hands of foreign colonialists".¹⁶

Similarly, the element of common experience has been repeatedly invoked. Subsequent to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the Republic of Guinea on October 4, 1959, the Communist Party daily hailing this event inter alia related it to the common experiences of the African and Chinese people and

15. Dutt, op.cit., p.272

16. HSINHUA (New China News Agency), April 14, 1960.

declared that the latter "fully understand and sympathize with the plight of the African people still under colonial rule and firmly support their heroic struggles for independence and freedom".¹⁷

Finally, in examining New China's relations with Africa, four different periods can be discerned. These are (i) Between Bandung 1955 and 1961, (ii) Between 1960 to 1965, (iii) Between mid 1960's to the end of the Cultural Revolution and lastly the period of the Seventies i.e. after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and in the wake of "ping-pong" diplomacy.

The first phase witnessed the beginning of contacts between PRC and the independent African States. By the end of 1959, only 9 African States were independent. Four of these had recognized China, namely, Egypt (1956), Morocco (1958), Sudan (1958) and Guinea (1959).

The second period was characterized by a major Chinese diplomatic offensive in Africa. The year 1960 has been called Africa Year. In that year alone, 16 African States attained their independence and became members of the United Nations. Between January 1960 and December 1965, a total of 29 African States won their independence. And during the peak of China's diplomatic thrust culminating in Premier Chou En-lai's visit to the Continent in 1964 and 1965, a total of fifteen African States had diplomatic relations with the Government in Peking.

Then followed the period of the Cultural Revolution which on the international plane at least, cost China a number of friends. Africa was no exception. This was the time when China retreated

17. Dutt, op.cit., p.286, quoting the October 5, 1959 editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao.

from active international diplomacy while continuing cooperative interaction with a selected few States including some African. By the end of this period, diplomatic ties with African States had been reduced to 13.

The post cultural revolution era and more particularly the period of the 1970's has catapulted China back to the period of active and indeed "aggressive" international diplomacy. By November 15, 1971, China had diplomatic relations with twenty-one African States.¹⁸

Following PRC's admission to the United Nations on October 25, 1971 and President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, there has been an intensification of China's ties with the countries of the world. In this connection, it is relevant to point out that in the pursuit of her international relations in the Seventies, China seems to have relegated the factor of militant ideological identification as a criteria for establishing good relations. Normalization of relations between the PRC and Africa, for example, transcends ideological or political affinities. Currently, Peking has diplomatic relations with the overwhelming majority of African States. Indeed, only a handful of African countries still maintain ties with the Taiwan regime.¹⁹ As an example of active diplomatic intercourse between China and the African States, reference could be made of the fact that between January and March this year alone, four

18. These were Algeria, Burundi, Cameroun, Congo (Brazaville), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, (though she temporarily suspended her ties with China and renewed them in 1972). Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suda, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Zambia. See Winberg Chai, op.cit., p.404

19. These include such countries as the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland.

African Heads of State paid official visits to China.²⁰

III

SINO-TANZANIA RELATIONS: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

President Nyerere has characterized the friendship between Tanzania and China as a "friendship between most unequal equals".²¹ The disparities in size, population, wealth, resources and power, to mention a few factors, between Tanzania and China clearly testify to the inequality of the two countries and yet despite such conspicuous differences, the ties between them "is based on (the) principles of respect and equality".²² In order to understand the very close ties that prevail between Dar es Salaam and Peking, it is important to underscore this point of equality in sovereign relationships.

African States are particularly sensitive on the issue of sovereign equality as they are on the principle of non-interference in their domestic affairs. Sometimes, it can be said that they are over-sensitive. Yet the fact that these new nations have just emerged from colonial bondage inheriting more often than not, fragile institutions susceptible to external manipulations, has led African political elites not to view with equanimity any attempt or trend by foreign powers geared towards involvement in domestic affairs.

-
20. President Mobutu of Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) was in China from January 10 - 20, 1974; Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Boumediene of Algeria were there in February, while President Nyerere of Tanzania visited the Peoples Republic of China in March.
21. President Nyerere's address at the return banquet he gave to Premier Chou En-lai on June 21, 1968 during the Tanzanian Leader's second visit to China. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, p.40.
22. Ibid.

This is not to suggest that foreign powers have left the African States alone. Far from that. Yet, it is a fact that, when such involvement is manifestly detected, the reaction is invariably extremely hostile if not violently so.

Thus, Nyerere's affirmation of Chinese respect for the principle of sovereign equality (since it is inconceivable that Tanzania will interfere in the domestic affairs of China) is an important element in understanding the development and consolidation of the relations between the two States. Here it may be pertinent to observe that Nyerere's view is fully shared by the leader of Tanzania's neighbour and an equally close friend of China. According to Zambia's President Kaunda, "the cooperation of the Chinese Government and people with the Tanzanian and Zambian Governments is based, inter alia, strictly on mutual respect and non-interference of their independent nations".²³

Indeed, so scrupulous have the Chinese been in observing the principle of non-interference in their relations with Tanzania, that even in the peak days of the Cultural revolution, there were no untoward incidents. Consequently, with all the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two countries went on uninterrupted.

Origin and Development of Ties

Chinese-Tanzanian relations can be classified into at least three different phases. These are, firstly, pre-independence; secondly, from independence to 1965 when President Nyerere visited

23. President Kenneth Kaunda's speech in Dar es Salaam in October 1970 inaugurating the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Schurman, et al, op.cit., p.572.

China and Premier Chou En-lai made a return visit to Tanzania during the same year and thirdly, the post 1965 period to the present.

According to some authorities, China's relations with Tanzania "began as early as 900 years ago".²⁴ The initial contacts took place in the form of indirect trade by the Arabs who visited the shores of East Africa. Such contacts are reported to have taken place beginning with the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Chinese merchandise like gold, silver, silk and porcelain were exchanged for Tanzanian items like rhinoceros horns and elephant tusks. Credibility is given to these claims by excavations at the town of Kilwa on the Southern Tanzanian coast undertaken in 1965 which uncovered Chinese porcelain dating back to the 12th and 13th Centuries.²⁵

Contemporary Sino-Tanzanian relations like contemporary Sino-African ties however, are very recent phenomena. Before Tanzania's independence, there were some contacts but these were limited. They were particularly evident in Zanzibar. There, through the nationalist political organizations, China established considerable contacts. Leaders and other officials of the Afro-Shirazi Party - ASP (now the Ruling and only Political Party in the Islands of Zanzibar) as well as the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) together with Trade Union Officials had visited Peking in the late 1950s and early 1960 as guests of such institutions as the Chinese Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee, the Chinese Peace Committee, the all

24. Premier Chou En-lai specifically referred to the 900 years historical ties in his address in Dar es Salaam on June 1965. Yu, op.cit., p.88.

25. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ANTIQUITIES DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR 1965, MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL CULTURE, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA.

China Federation of Trade Unions, the All China Youth Federation, the All China Students Federation and the All China Federation of Journalists Organization. Some Zanzibar students were also sent to Peking and it is among them who helped training the staff of the Swahili section of Radio Peking. Furthermore, at least one prominent Zanzibari leader served as a correspondent of the Chinese News Agency - HSINHUA in Zanzibar prior to independence.²⁶

In Tanganyika or what is known as Mainland Tanzania, the little contacts that there were between the Nationalist Party there - The Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) and the Chinese authorities existed within the framework of multilateral cooperation in the context of AAPSO. Such contacts therefore could only have taken place after the founding of the organization in 1958.

Despite these limited pre-independence contacts, when Tanganyika achieved its independence on December 9, 1961, among those countries which were officially invited to attend the independence celebrations was the Peoples Republic of China.²⁷

In Zanzibar where a revolution had taken place on January 12, 1964 - only a month after the country's independence from Britain,

-
26. This was Abdul Rahman Mohammed Babu who in the wake of the Zanzibar Revolution on January 12, 1964, became the first Foreign Affairs and Defence (subsequently Foreign Affairs and Trade) Minister of the Peoples Republic of Zanzibar. Later, Mr. Babu served for a number of years as a Government Minister of the Union Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar took place on April 26, 1964. John Dickie and Alan Rake, WHO'S WHO IN AFRICA. African Buyer and Trader Publication, London, 1973, pp.500-501.
27. China was represented at the independence ceremonies by Ambassador Huang Hua, currently Peking's number one man at the United Nations. This marked the beginning of official contacts between the new Government of Tanganyika and the PRC. Establishment of diplomatic relations followed immediately thereafter, and Tanganyika and then Tanzania consistently and actively supported the "restoration of the lawful rights of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations".

China, on February 6, 1964 extended diplomatic recognition to the new regime and thus became the ninth country to do so.²⁸

Between 1961 and January 1965, Sino-Tanzanian relations were generally low keyed. The exception was in Zanzibar where in the wake of the revolution, the PRC proceeded to extend considerable economic and technical assistance. Then came Mwalimu Nyerere's spectacular visit to China in February 1965. Students of Sino-Tanzanian relations generally concur that this visit marked a turning point in the relations between the two countries.

The Tanzanian leader and his party came back from their visit wholly impressed by China. The spirit of discipline, hard work, organization and frugality made a lasting impact on the Tanzanians. Nyerere, himself an extraordinarily humble and simple man, was particularly moved by the simplicity and humility of the Chinese leaders and other ranks alike. So impressed was he with his visit that he was to state while in Shanghai that he wished he could bring all the Tanzanians to China "and witness for themselves what a determined people can do".²⁹

One of the outcome of this visit was the signing on February 20, 1965 of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship. The signatories were President Nyerere and Chairman Liu Shao-chih. The Treaty which runs for ten years with the provision of automatic renewal for another ten years, stipulated in Article II that relations between the two countries were to be based on the Five Principles of

28. THE AFRO-SHIRAZI PARTY REVOLUTION - 1964-1974, Printed by PRINTPAK, Dar es Salaam, 1974, p.11.

29. Nyerere, op.cit., p.44.

Peaceful Co-existence.³⁰

A joint communique issued following the conclusion of the Tanzanian leader's visit described the Friendship Treaty as marking "a new phase in the development of the relationship and cooperation between the two countries".³¹ Events were to confirm this prediction.

As stated earlier, Nyerere's visit was followed up by the State Visit of Chou En-lai the same year. In 1968, the Tanzanian leader paid his second visit to China. This was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution and the fact that he was received with overwhelming warmth by itself related the story of Sino-Tanzanian relations. His third and most recent visit was in March of this year. In all the three occasions, he was received by Chairman Mao Tse-tung besides having extensive discussions with Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders.

From 1965 onwards there have been a multitude of exchange of delegations - at different levels - between the two countries. Subsequent to Nyerere's visit a period of rapid expansion of cooperative interaction between the two countries ensued. The cooperation has been in different fields including economic, trade, technical, cultural and military. Undoubtedly, the most important project has

30. These are the same five principles of Panch Sheel first enunciated in an agreement between India and China in 1954. They are:

- (i) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- (ii) Mutual Non-aggression
- (iii) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- (iv) Equality and mutual benefit
- (v) Peaceful Co-existence.

For details of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship, See Yu, op.cit., pp.89 - 91. On the origin of the Five Principles, see Sudhakar Bhatt, INDIA AND CHINA, Popular Book Services, New Delhi, 1967, p.15.

31. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965 - 1966, p.20755.

been the \$400 million interest free loan - the largest single loan so far - to build the 1163 miles (1860 km.) Tanzania-Zambia Railway linking the copper regions of Zambia at Kapiri Mposhi with coastal Tanzania at Dar es Salaam. In view of the magnitude of this loan and its dimensional importance, both for the two recipient countries as well as for Africa, it is proposed to consider this project when an examination is made in the next chapter on the role of aid and experts in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy in Africa - taking Tanzania as an example.

But besides the Railway, there have been a number of important bilateral projects. On the military side for example, China is assisting in the training and equipping of the Tanzanian defence forces including its airforce.³² It is not possible here to tabulate all the aid projects, loans etc, undertaken by China in Tanzania. However, a few examples could suffice to illustrate the rising cooperative interaction between the two nations. The Table on the next page provides such an illustration:

32. On July 7, 1974. on the occasion of 20th Anniversary of the founding of the Ruling Party, T.A.N.U., the Tanzanian Air force displayed its mig-fighters. China had assisted in the training of the Tanzanian pilots. The Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, July 8, 1974, p.1.

TABLE Showing Examples of Chinese Credits and Aid Projects in Tanzania³³

Value in \$ Million	Recipient and Type of Aid	Date of Credit or Grant
.5	Zanzibar Grant	February 1964
14.0	" Credit	8 June 1964
2.8	Tanzania Grant	17 June 1964
42.0	" Credit	17 June 1964
2.8	" Grant	June 1966
5.6	" Credit	June 1966
2.1	" Credit for Joint Shipping line	8 July 1966

Projects Undertaken 1966-1969	Description
Joint Shipping Line	Sino-Tanzanian Line. Two 10,000 ton vessels. PRC lent Tanzania's initial capital of Pounds 750,000. The Line opened in mid 1968.
Textile Mill (Friendship)	Foundation Stone laid on July 29, 1966. Operational since 1968. \$7 million for construction and equipment - interest free loan. About 3,000 workers employed in the mill. The mill currently produces about 24,000 sq. yds. of cloth a year.
Farm Implements and Factory	Value pounds 174,000. Financed from long term Chinese loan.
Shoe Factory	Opened at Mtoni, Zanzibar, Value pounds 100,000.
Agricultural Equipment	China assisting in massive agricultural development. Establishment of State farms in both Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania. Tractor repairing in Zanzibar.
Communications	Short-wave transmitters for Radio Station in the mainland.
Sports	An Impressive sports stadium in Zanzibar - the best in East Africa.
Pharmaceutical Plant	A Chinese built gift.

33. Source: Larkin, op.cit., pp.97-98 and Tanzania Newspapers Statistics including also releases by the Ministry of Information, Dar es Salaam. For details of other projects, see Yu, op.cit.

The most recent assistance given by PRC to Tanzania followed the third visit of President Nyerere in March this year. China extended a credit of \$75 million - (interest free loan) repayable in ten years after five years grace period. The loan is to enable Tanzania to exploit the rich iron and coal deposits in Southern Tanzania and for the construction of a railway link to which would connect with the main TANZAM Railway.³⁴ Hailing this loan as an example of true aid, the Tanzanian Government owned Newspaper praised China and criticized "the imperialists and their fellow travellers who talk glibly about aid but almost in every case their 'aid' does not only take longer to negotiate but is also tied to heavy interest".³⁵

Perhaps the magnitude of Chinese assistance to Tanzania can be understood by pointing out the fact that currently China is the largest aid donor to that country. In his address to the National Assembly, Tanzania's Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Dr. Chagula, told the Parliamentarians that Tanzania's biggest foreign debt was with the PRC. The figure given was Tanzania shillings 1,949,319,625/- (Shs. 7.14 is equivalent to \$1.00).³⁶ This statement was made March 14, 1974 i.e. before the announcement of the \$75 million loan negotiated when the Tanzanian leader was in Peking towards the end of that month.

Trade between the two countries has also witnessed a gigantic increase. Thus, for example, whereas Tanzania mainland's exports

34. The Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, April 2, 1974, p.1

35. The Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, April 3, 1974, p.1
(editorial)

36. The Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, March 15, 1974, p.1

to China in 1961 were an insignificant \$1.2 thousand, by 1968 the volume had increased to \$7.7 million. Correspondingly, over the same period Tanzania mainland's imports from China rose from \$10.7 thousand to \$12.0 million. The balance of trade is in China's favour and is likely to remain so until the completion of the Tanzam Railway since in order to offset local costings of the Project, both Zambia and Tanzania are expected to buy Chinese goods as part of the overall agreement.³⁷

IV

ON THE ROLE OF AID AND EXPERTS

One of the most constantly praised aspects of Chinese foreign policy in the African continent and for that matter in the Third World in general, is PRC's conception and practices on the question of aid. The generous terms offered by the Chinese donors to many of the recipients in Africa, Asia and Latin America, has been a matter of public acclaim by different African spokesmen. Thus, for example, President Senghor of Senegal - by no means a foe of France - is reported to have criticized the terms of French aid while hailing

37. Yu, op.cit. Critics of Chinese aid assert that China wants to turn the developing countries into a dumping ground for her cheap manufactured goods by making it part of the aid agreement that a certain proportion of the local costs should be offset by buying Chinese goods. They relate this with the Western concept of loan tied to purchasing from the donor country. They are comparing two different things. The Chinese policy is actually intended to waive part of the local costs or counterpart contribution because recipients do not buy Chinese goods with the given aid but do ~~no~~ buy such goods with what they would have paid as counterpart contribution as in the case of the UNDP. Whereas in the Western concept of tied loan, recipients buy the goods from the donor country with the actual aid given.

Chinese assistance. Similarly, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, in an impressive address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973, characterized Chinese aid as the really genuine assistance. He stated:

"...Since the month of January this year, Zaire has been the scene of a unique experiment in the field of cooperation: that is, the assistance given by China to my country. The Chinese technical assistants in our country receive no air tickets from us and they transfer no salaries to their home country. The Chinese experts adopt the same way of life as their Zaire counterparts. The Chinese moves about, lives and eats exactly as does his Zaire counterpart. In the field of financial assistance, China has given us considerable credits on a very long term and without interest. This, in my view, is a very good example to follow if you want to help an under-equipped country".³⁸

The whole question of aid is of course a matter of different interpretation. Some Western developed countries have included in their definition of aid such things as foreign economic investment, which in the final analysis, has the effect of extracting more from the recipient country than what it initially gives.

Delivering a lecture to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Christchurch on March 18, 1974, Dr. Nyerere specified three areas which can be identified as real aid.³⁹ These are:

- (i) Capital grants, i.e. transfer of international purchasing power - if not tied - are genuine if such grants meet the needs of the recipients;
- (ii) Making available skilled manpower or executives for advisory purposes at low cost or no cost at all;

38. Provisional Verbatim Record of the United Nations General Assembly Twenty-eighth Session, Document A/PV.2140, p.71.

39. Address by President Julius Nyerere to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs on March 18, 1974, entitled "Aid and Development from a Recipient's Point of View". The speech was delivered during the Tanzanian leader's state visit to New Zealand. The Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tuesday, March 19, 1974, p.1.

(iii) Loans which carry no interest or low interest rates.

Such loans contain large amounts of aid provided that they are not tied to purchasing from high-cost lending nations.

The experience of Tanzani^a-China relations has been such that the former has received from the latter all the types of assistance enumerated above. The statistics provided in the previous chapter of this study confirm this. President Nyerere referring to the agreement on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway made some pertinent comments on the question of Chinese aid. He said: "...the terms of the loan and of the technical assistance the work requires are an example to the world of what friendship and revolutionary solidarity mean. The rich nations of the world talk about aid to the poor nations. A few of them give it, but many of them use the concept of aid as a cover to further exploit the poorer nations. China which is not a rich country has talked about nothing. It has simply made it possible for us to have a railway linking our two African States without profiting out of our need or without making great propaganda".⁴⁰ In order to have a better understanding of Chinese principles on aid, it is useful to refer back to an interview which Premier Chou En-lai had in January 15, 1964 with reporters of the Ghana News Agency in Accra. The Chinese leader, who was on an official visit to Ghana, elaborated on the following eight principles which guide Chinese economic and technical assistance:⁴¹

-
40. President Nyerere's speech at the State banquet given in his honour by Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai in Peking, March 24, 1974; Press Release IS/1.301, dated March 24, 1974, issued by the Information Services Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Dar es Salaam, pp. 4-5.
41. Premier Chou-En-lai's interview, January 15, 1964, reproduced in Afro-Asian Solidarity against Imperialism, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1964, pp. 146-150. See also Winberg-Chai, op cit. pp.225 - 226, and Yu, op.cit., p.46.

- (i) Aid is on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
It should not be considered as unilateral alms; it must promote the economies of new emerging nations which in itself constitutes support for China;
- (ii) Respect for the sovereignty of recipients and no privileges or conditions;
- (iii) Loans should be interest-free or of low interest and there should be a provision of extension of the repayment period.
- (iv) Aid should not create dependency relationships but must assist recipients on the road to self-reliance;
- (v) Construction of projects requiring less investment but yielding quicker results;
- (vi) Modern equipment - best available - to be provided;
- (vii) Train personnel in recipient countries to master the equipment provided;
- (viii) Chinese experts should be treated at par with local experts and there should be no special demands or amenities.

These principles indeed coincide and compliment the elaboration made by Nyerere in his New Zealand speech. What is perhaps more important is the fact that from the Tanzanian experience, the Chinese have lived up to the letter and spirit of these principles. Principle Eight particularly comes into focus with regard to the Chinese technicians and other workers sent to Tanzania. They have acted in an exemplary manner. They have made no special demands and have in fact behaved in a more humble and less demanding manner than even some of their Tanzanian counterparts. In a sense, it can be said that

if the Chinese have influenced Tanzania, then the greatest influence is not so much ideological or because of the tremendous assistance that the Chinese gives to Tanzania, but rather in the exemplary performance of the Chinese's best ambassadors in the persons of the experts and other workers sent there. According to Nyerere, "the spirit with which they (the Chinese experts) work and their daily example in commitment and dedication have won for this country (China) a unique place in the hearts and minds of my countrymen".⁴² Such behaviour on the part of the Chinese personnel gives credence to the statement made by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping in his address to the General Assembly Special Session on the Question of Raw Materials and Development, made on April 9, 1974, when he asserted:

"We hold that technology transferred to the developing countries must be practical, efficient, economical and convenient for use. The experts and other personnel dispatched to the recipient countries have the obligation to pass on conscientiously technical know-how to the people there and to respect the laws and national customs of the countries concerned. They must not make special demands or ask for special amenities, let alone engage in illegal activities".⁴³

The TANZAM Railway

Reference has already been made to the singular most important project undertaken by the PRC in Eastern Africa - the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Known in Tanzania as the "Great Uhuru Railway", the project is a monumental tribute to Chinese efficiency and capability as well as being a vivid demonstration of the strengthening of friendly ties that prevail between, on the one hand, China and

-
42. President Nyerere's speech at a State Banquet on March 24, 1974. Peking Review, No. 13, March 29, 1974, p.9.
43. A/PV.2209, pp. 93-95.

on the other, Tanzania and Zambia.⁴⁴

The Great Uhuru (Swahili word for freedom) Railway is undoubtedly one of the most significant projects of the past decade. The Railway in its importance compares favourably with the Soviet-built Aswan Dam in Egypt. But in its dimensions, the TANZAM Railway surpasses the importance of the Aswan in that whereas the latter was a project essentially to benefit Egypt, the former apart from being an undertaking involving two States, it is also a project of far-reaching significance in Africa.

-
44. Construction of the Shs. 2865 million (\$400 million) project started in October 1970. The loan given by PRC to finance the Railway is an interest-free one with a grace period of 15 years. Repayment begins in 1983 and is expected to be completed in 2012. According to Mwalimu Nyerere, "This is real 'aid'. Thus to say the very least, the Chinese people are not planning to make a profit from this railway. Indeed, they are making a gift to us, for it would be very expensive to borrow this amount of money at commercial rates of interest". And, perhaps ridiculing those who conceive of every Chinese involvement in cold war terms, Nyerere added, "the Chinese people have not asked us to be communists in order to qualify for this loan". Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 235. The prominent Nigerian journalist, Peter Enahoro described the terms of the Railway loan as "a loan seeker's dream". Peter Enahoro, "African Socialism", Africa; International Business, Economic and Political Monthly, No. 6, 1972. Published by African Journal Ltd., London, January 1972, p.56.

Though in accordance with the Agreement, the Railway is scheduled to be completed in late 1976, all indications are that it will be over by 1975 - at least one year ahead of schedule. Indeed, in September last year when the Railway construction moved into Zambia after completing the Tanzanian part, the Railway builders had completed about 600 miles of the Railway - some 18 months ahead of schedule. Even the Railway's greatest detractors, the South Africans had to admit that the Railway, "stands as a monument to Chinese efficiency...". To the Point, September 8, 1973, Johannesburg, South Africa, p.23.

As President Kaunda succinctly put it, "The completion of the railway line will have tremendous significance to Zambia's future as a strong, prosperous and truly independent nation; to the economy of Tanzania and Zambia; to the growing fraternal relations between neighbouring nations in Eastern Africa and to the friendly ties between us in this part of the world and the Chinese people".⁴⁵

The importance of this Railway can be perceived in at least four different - not mutually exclusive - contexts. Firstly, it would provide a reliable outlet for Zambian exports and imports. Zambia, due to its colonial legacy, has had to rely on the Southern routes, i.e. routes controlled by the white minority colonial regimes. The Railway will therefore free Zambia from dependency on the colonial and racist regimes, which have since Zambia's independence subjected her to political blackmail and at times, military provocations due to the country's support for the African liberation movements. Thus, it will reinforce the alliance of freedom which exists between Tanzania and Zambia and will help both countries to withstand the pressures exerted upon them by "the enemies of African dignity and African freedom".⁴⁶ Furthermore, in strengthening Zambia - the front line State which bears the greatest burden in supporting the African liberation struggle in Southern Africa - the whole of Africa will benefit.⁴⁷ The African component of the Railway's significance is therefore the second factor.

45. President Kaunda's address in Dar es Salaam in October 1970 Schurman, et al., op.cit., p. 570. See also Larkin, op.cit., p.9.

46. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p.234

47. Ibid.

Thirdly, the Railway will be a great asset to Tanzania particularly in developing the Southern part of the country where large deposits of coal and iron ore lie unexploited due primarily to communication difficulties. Southern Tanzania also has some of the country's potentially richest agricultural areas.

Fourthly, the Railway will facilitate trade between different countries. The bigger beneficiaries will be the countries of Eastern Africa whose close contacts, the Railway will make possible.⁴⁸

For the Chinese, the Railway has not only brought them great goodwill and appreciation from Eastern Africa, but above all, as the correspondent of the OBSERVER aptly put it, the project has in many ways "acted as a model for her mounting successes in the continent during the past two years" while for the "West and particularly Britain and the United States, who refused to build the railway and never really believed that China would do so, the significance lies more in the lost opportunity and pandering to myths about China in the sixties".⁴⁹

Talking about lost opportunities, it is relevant to recapitulate here albeit briefly, the outright refusal of the Western countries to build the Railway. Indeed the World Bank, in 1964, rejected the

48. Ibid.

49. David Martin, "The 'freedom' train that left Britain behind", The Observer, London, 26 August, 1973.

Furthermore, the equipment provided and the conduct of the more than 10,000 Chinese experts and skilled workers who have been involved in the construction and at the same time imparting knowledge on their Tanzanian and Zambian colleagues, seems to considerably enhance PRC's reputation in Africa. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the assessment of noted British writer Guy Arnold. He wrote: "They (the Chinese) train well. The Chinese appear to be exceptionally good at seeing that the equipment they provide suits the environment and training of its recipients". G. Arnold, "Tanzania and Foreign Aid", AFRICA, No. 29, January 1974, p.27.

project on the grounds that development in the then Tanganyika and Zambia could be best served by other projects. All approaches to the West to finance the Railway were abortive. Both Tanzania and Zambia were particularly keen to have the project undertaken by the West and further approaches were made even when China had already indicated its readiness to assist in the construction.⁵⁰ The public arguments used by the Western governments was that the project was uneconomic. Yet as Martin reveals:

"One of the most frequent arguments against the Great Uhuru Railway is that it is not a viable project. Yet, after Nyerere received the Chinese offer and again approached the West, an Anglo-Canadian financed study was carried out. The report is still secret but parts that are known indicate that the economic argument is false".⁵¹

Both Kaunda and Nyerere have on a number of occasions referred to the western opposition to the Railway project. Speaking on October 1970 at an inaugural ceremony marking the beginning of the construction of the Railway, the Zambian President stated:

"We accepted this generous offer of the Chinese friends - true friends at that - to construct it (the Railway) when all other nations, not only stood aloof hoping to force upon land-locked Zambia more dependence on the minority regimes, but to sabotage any efforts in favour of successful diversification of her economy and to reduce our dependence on the South".⁵²

And in Peking on March 24, 1974, Nyerere was more forthright in his criticisms of the West:

"...When we looked to the wealthy nations and institutions of the West for helping remedy the situation (eliminating the dependency on the minority regimes), we found that their protestations of friendship did not mean a willingness to help us against the danger from the racist and colonialist States in Southern Africa. They assured us that a railway was uneconomic and unnecessary - as it indeed from their point of view. For a railway between Zambia and Tanzania will

50. Larkin, op.cit., p. 100.

51. David Martin, op.cit.

52. Schurman et al, op.cit., p.572 (emphasis added).

"take traffic from the railway built by, and meant for the benefit of the imperialist forces. And it would strengthen the economies and security of both our anti-imperialist States".⁵³

V

EXAMINING CHINESE AND TANZANIAN
GOALS (OBJECTIVES)

The preceding two chapters have clearly demonstrated the extent of PRC's cooperative interaction with Tanzania. Obviously, China has invested heavily in Tanzania. Since it is an accepted reality of international relations that there are no altruistic nations, it stands to reason to try and assess China's motives and goals in its partnership with the East African State. It would also be pertinent to evaluate the goals of the unequal member of this "partnership of equality" - Tanzania. Perhaps, the easier way to indulge in this exercise which, it must be pointed, in the final analysis can only be speculative and conjectural, is to start by dismissing those hypothesis which are obviously false or over exaggerated.

Some observers (one suspects at the behest of South African propaganda) have speculated that China intends to use Tanzania as a military base. Indeed, some have even talked of the existence of such military installations in the Islands' part of

53. Press Release No. IS/I.301 dated March 24, 1974, issued by the Information Services, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Dar es Salaam, p.5.

Tanzania.⁵⁴ But such allegations are ludicrous and they fail to appreciate the nationalist, Africanist and anti-imperialist content of Tanzania's foreign policy.

As an actively Non-aligned State, Tanzania is firmly opposed in word and deed to setting up of military bases in foreign lands. For a better understanding of Tanzania's independent postures in the conduct of its foreign affairs and the jealousy with which the country holds its independence, it is of significance to reflect what Nyerere told the Chinese leaders during his second State Visit to China in 1968:

"My colleagues and I have not come to China to ask China to place a protective nuclear umbrella over Tanzania. Colonialism in Africa passed under many labels. Some of our countries were called colonies, other protectorates, some provinces and yet others trust territories. In fact they were all colonies, and all of them rightly rejected their colonial status. If, therefore, I had come to ask China to declare Tanzania to be her nuclear protectorate, the people of Tanzania would have every right to denounce me as a lackey of nuclear neo-colonialism".⁵⁵

Then there is the question of communist "influence" or if you will, "domination". In the aftermath of "ping-pong" diplomacy, much of the propaganda about the PRC being the most militant doctrinaire country with the implication that to deal with her was to expose oneself to "communist menace", has waned. Yet, it ought to be pointed out that the consolidation of Sino-Tanzanian ties took place

-
54. In an original report on the Indian Ocean pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 3080(XXVIII), prepared by a group of experts (from India, Iran and expert from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI), it was alleged that China has a naval base in Zanzibar, A/AC.159/1 of 3 May, 1974, p.23. This was such a distortion that the report, at the direction of the UN Secretary-General had to be withdrawn. The same experts prepared a new report in which they categorically affirmed that "China has no bases in the Indian Ocean nor does it deploy any of its naval units there". Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, statement pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly Resolution 3080(XXVIII). A/AC.159/1/Rev.1 of 11 July, 1974, p.4.
55. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p.41

long before "Sinophilia" engulfed some western countries and in particular the United States. The question then arises, does ideology play any role in the Sino-Tanzanian relations? This is a rather difficult question to provide a categorical reply.

If by ideology inference is given to the application by Tanzania of a social system based on the so-called principles of "Maoism", then the answer is obviously negative. According to Larkin, "Ideological companionship between China's leadership and the African Statesmen is tenuous at best. Nyerere's commitments in the Arusha Declaration and Kaunda's proclamation of "humanism" are certainly inconsistent with Chinese ideological preferences".⁵⁶ Yet, there is considerable appreciation by Tanzania of the Chinese model of socialism. Nyerere puts the Tanzanian's view as follows:

"Whatever your current discussions about tactics and strategy for the future, I think one thing is certain: China is providing an encouragement and an inspiration for younger and smaller nations which seek to build socialist societies. We may not always agree with this or that aspect of your policies. We may decide that certain of your practices are inappropriate or unacceptable to us. But we are indebted to you for the contribution which China, under leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party, has made to the development of Socialism. And you have our very warm and brotherly good wishes for your future".⁵⁷

There is therefore a certain amount of ideological solidarity but not identity and consequently, it would be unwise to put much emphasis on the ideology as a variable linking PRC to Tanzania.

Western inspired propaganda at times talked of the possibility of the Chinese looking for settlements in Tanzania and Zambia. As such propaganda would have it, the Chinese, in dearth of room for

56. Larkin, op.cit., p.100.

57. President Nyerere's address at the Return Banquet given in honour of Premier Chou En-lai in March, 1974. THE DAILY NEWS TANZANIA, Dar es Salaam, April 10, 1974.

expansion, would strive to stay permanently in East Africa. This propaganda gained particular momentum with the construction of the Railway and the presence in Tanzania as in Zambia of thousands of Chinese. Any serious student of Sino-African relations would simply ignore such absurdities. Nevertheless, it is perhaps illuminating to quote President Kaunda's reply to a question raised by a correspondent of the Africa Magazine.

Asked, whether he shared the apprehension one hears from some people that once the Chinese come in numbers they will wish to stay for good, President Kaunda replied:

"...It is the people who are saying that who are staying here. The Chinese when they come, do a job, finish it and go back to China. Up to now we have not seen any Chinese settlements here. They keep to themselves with the very same humility I am talking about. They do not show themselves around...Because they (those who talk about Chinese settlements) are afraid of that system which fights exploitation of man by man, Puna, they are propagating against the Chinese".⁵⁸

President Kaunda could as well be speaking for President Nyerere on this point.

There are nevertheless a number of tangible reasons in which one can conceive of Chinese goals in her relations with Tanzania.

At the very beginning of this study, mention has been made of PRC's identification with and active involvement in third world matters. Sino-Tanzanian relations provide an illuminating example of third world solidarity in action. Furthermore, the fact that Tanzania possesses unquestionable revolutionary credentials in the context of third world politics - serves to confirm PRC's conception of the African struggle being a major link in the world revolutionary movement. By cooperating and collaborating with Tanzania therefore,

58. Mlimo Punabantu, "ZAMBIA GOES EAST?" AFRICA, No. 33, May 1974, pp. 27-28.

PRC is achieving a twin objective - third world solidarity and confirmation of PRC's revolutionary credentials. Here, Premier Chou En-lai's perception of Tanzania is both relevant and significant. "Tanzania", declared the Chinese Prime Minister at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam on June, 1965, "has become a glorious banner in East Africa, a banner against old and new colonialism and for national liberation struggles".⁵⁹

The question of national liberation struggle assumes a particular significance in the case of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam is not only the Headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee⁶⁰ but also plays host to almost all African liberation movements. PRC's commitment to and support for the African liberation movement is a matter of common knowledge.⁶¹ Indeed, China provides considerable assistance including arms, materiel, finance etc., to the liberation movements. She also helps in the training of many African freedom fighters. Since Tanzania is equally committed to the liberation struggle and does indeed provide facilities to the movements - there is a clear community of interests between her and the PRC. This, it can be said with emphasis, is an important binding link between the two countries.

59. Yu, op.cit., p.86.

60. Created by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity during their founding Conference in 1963, the Liberation Committee is coordinating the channeling of assistance to the African liberation movements. It began as a Committee of Nine, then expanded to 11 with a further expansion to 17. Currently, the Committee comprises of 21 member States of the OAU.

61. President Kaunda has hailed "the depth of the Chinese commitment to our cause in Africa, which is the cause of the masses of the Continent". AFRICA, May 17, 1974, p.26.

Sino-Tanzanian relations have also given PRC a consistent "ally" in terms of China's movement towards international recognition and "acceptability". According to Professor Yu, "China's Tanzania policy served the vital objective of securing and giving substance to China's international legitimacy in the world of Africa, Asia and Latin America".⁶² Indeed, Tanzania has, for example, vigorously and consistently championed China's rights at the United Nations. The Tanzanian delegation was one of the active floor managers in the Chinese representation debate in October 1971 leading to the restoration of its lawful rights and the "simultaneous expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" from the United Nations.⁶³

What of the Tanzanian goals?

To begin with, the basis of Tanzania's initial interaction with China was based on the premise that it was absurd to ignore a country of such power and potential. Subsequent to the promotion of contacts and relations between the two countries, Tanzania came to be impressed with many facets of the Chinese experiment including in particular such elements as the spirit of hard work, discipline, simplicity and frugality as well as the concept and practise of self-reliance - so evident in the Chinese Society. Repeatedly, both Kaunda and Nyerere have declared that there was a lot to be learnt from

62. Yu, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

63. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nine-Hundred and Seventy-Sixth Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly - Twenty Sixth Session, A/PV.1976, 25 October, 1971 pp. 157-232.

China.⁶⁴

Perhaps a more fundamental aspect of Tanzania's ties with China is that these ties with all their implications provide for Tanzania a unique opportunity to maintain its policy of non-alignment. By developing relations with China, Tanzania's process of eliminating the imperialist relations of dependency has been given a tremendous booster. In this regard, China has provided Tanzania with new links encompassing multifaceted areas - economic, trade, technical cooperation, etc. In brief, Tanzania's ties with PRC has widened the former's options in the international relations.

VI

CONCLUSION

The case of Tanzania perhaps represents the finest form of China's cooperative interaction with Africa today. For more than a decade, relations between China and the East African State have proceeded on a smooth and progressive pace, unaffected even by the imponderables of the cultural revolution.

64. See Kaunda's interview in Africa Magazine, No. 33, May 1974, pp. 26-29. See also Nyerere's statement during his last visit to China. Daily News, Tanzania, March 25, 1974. Furthermore, the mere presence of China in the international scene is viewed by some African leaders like Nyerere as an important plus for them. Thus, Nyerere told a correspondent of the New Internationalist:

"China is playing a role which is good for us. And I am not saying this because the Chinese are angels - I am not saying anything of the kind. I have immense respect for them, but I am saying China is playing that role not because China consists of Angels but because China is there. As Nixon has discovered and as the West is discovering; China is there". The NEW INTERNATIONALIST, U.K., May 1973.

Both China and Tanzania have a stake in maintaining and promoting their friendly ties. Yet, quite clearly if this friendship of 'most unequal equals' had stood the tests of time, it is because of the strict observance of the principles with which it was based. To China, Tanzania is a reliable third world friend and partner. From a Tanzanian perspective, China is conceived as a power which has a lot in common with the Africans and which has demonstrated its good will, understanding and appreciation of Tanzania's as indeed Africa's problems and aspirations.

Relations have been smooth and even excellent. Yet, there are clear differences between them on a number of issues. What has sustained the ties has been the ability and determination of both to respect these differences and recognize that despite them, greater areas of convergence and cooperation exist. The guiding spirit has been the maximalisation of the converging views and non-dramatization of the areas of divergence. Thus, while Tanzania's position of opposing the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of its in-built discriminating provisions (allowing vertical but prohibiting horizontal proliferation among other elements) coincided with PRC's opposition to the Treaty; China's insistence on the holding of the second Asian-African Summit Conference after President Ben Bella's overthrowal in Algeria, was in complete variance with Tanzania's position. The latter actively worked for its postponement. As it turned out the Conference was never held.

Given this background, it is reasonable to assume that Sino-Tanzanian relations are likely to grow rather than diminish serving as a symbol of Afro-Asian Solidarity and Third World cooperation in action.

This study took off with an examination of a general African perspective of PRC's relations. It would therefore be proper to conclude in a similar vein. Since her admission to the United Nations, China has made tremendous strides in her relations with the African States. She now maintains relations with about thirty five African States. More importantly, with each of these, the ties have gone far and beyond the level of pure formalism. Aids and loans on generous terms modelled in identical terms like those to Tanzania and Zambia have been given to a multitude of African States. Of particular significance in this respect is the fact that the nature of the regimes in the recipient States or past differences with them, seem to have mattered little. For example, Ethiopia, a feudal aristocracy⁶⁵ received in 1972 an interest free loan of \$100 million after the Emperor's visit to China. More recently, Cameroun, whose President was at one time denounced by PRC, was given a loan of \$73 million. Considerable aid has also been given to countries like Zaire and Ghana to mention a few.⁶⁶

If the example of Chile is anything to go by, it is clear that China is determined to maintain her relations with the third world countries irrespective of which regime is in power. Perhaps this approach which is a clear deviation, if not complete departure from PRC's former militant doctrinaire postures, is part of the same process of maximising friends and as far as possible minimize or neutralize Soviet "influence". Whatever the reasons, there are grounds to believe that Sino-African ties have entered a new and more stable era.

65. The aid was given before the upheavals of this year there which have literally reduced the Emperor to a position of mere figure head.

66. TO THE POINT, op.cit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) BOOKS

1. AFRO-SHIRAZI PARTY REVOLUTION 1964-1974, Printed by PRINTPAK, Dar es Salaam, 1974.
2. Chai, Winberg, The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Capricorn Books, New York, 1972
3. Dickie, John and Rake, Alan, Who's Who in Africa, Africa Buyer and Trade (Publications) Ltd., London, 1973.
4. Dutt, Vidya Prakash, China's Foreign Policy 1958-1962, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1964.
5. Larkin, Bruce D., China and Africa 1949-1970, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1971.
6. Milton David, Milton Nancy and Shurmann, Franz, (eds.) People's China, Vintage Books, New York, 1974.
7. Northedge, F.S., ed., The Foreign Policy of the Powers, Faber and Faber, London 1969.
8. Nyerere, Julius, K., Freedom and Unity, Oxford University Press, London, 1966.
9. _____ Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, London, 1968.
10. _____ Freedom and Development, Oxford University Press, London, 1974.
11. Yu, George T., China and Tanzania, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1970.

(B) MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, PAMPHLETS AND PERIODICALS

Annual Report of the Antiquities Department for the Year 1965, Ministry of Community Development and National Culture, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Arnold, Guy, "Tanzania and Foreign Aid", AFRICA, No. 29, Africa Journal Ltd., London, January 1972.

Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 15 March, 1974.
_____, Dar es Salaam, 25 March, 1974.
_____, Dar es Salaam, 2 April, 1974
_____, Dar es Salaam, 3 April, 1974
_____, Dar es Salaam, 10 April, 1974

Enahoro, Peter, "African Socialism", AFRICA, No. 6, Africa Journal Ltd., London, January, 1972.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1965-1966, Keesings' Publications, Ltd., Bristol.

Martin, David, "The 'freedom' train that left Britain behind", The OBSERVER, London, 26 August, 1973.

Mlimo, Punabantu, "Zambia Goes East", AFRICA, No. 33, Africa Journal Ltd., London, May 1974.

Peking Review, No. 13, March 29, 1974.

Press Release IS/I.301, of 24 March, 1974, Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Dar es Salaam.

The New Internationalist, United Kingdom, May, 1973.

THE TENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (DOCUMENTS), Foreign Languages Press. Peking, 1973.

To The Point, Johannesburg, South Africa, 8 September, 1973.

(C) UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Verbatim Records: A/PV.1976, A/PV.1983, A/PV.2140 and A/PV.2209.

Reports: A/AC.159/1 of May 3, 1974.
A/AC.159/1 Rev.1 of July 11, 1974.