

DECOLONIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES IN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE - BACKGROUND
AND PROSPECTS

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INTRODUCTION

An Overview

The five hundred years Portuguese colonial empire in Africa is at last crumbling. Portugal, the first European nation to visit the shores of Africa and the last to cling stubbornly to its imperial rule, has now accepted the principle of decolonization and its application vis-a-vis the so-called overseas territories, thus presaging an end of a truly anachronistic situation. For the paradox of Portuguese colonialism has been that in an era of decolonization, Portugal was able to maintain colonial possessions twenty four times the size of the metropolis. She was able to do so principally due to the support she attained from some of her allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹ These were the same powers which declared their public condemnation of colonialism at the United Nations and other international fora.

Only nine months ago, to talk of decolonization was considered

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1. There is abundant documentation on the nature and role of Western assistance to Portugal. See for example UN Conference Room paper SCI/74/4 of May 7, 1974. There is no dispute that Portugal has been receiving massive economic and military assistance from the Western countries. What has, however, been contested by spokesmen of some of the allies of Portugal was the fact that such assistance has been used to perpetuate Portuguese colonial war effort and thus Portuguese colonialism. (In defence of such a position, see for example, statement of the United States delegation to the 28th Session of the General Assembly on November 2. A/P.V.2163, p. 32). Opponents of Portuguese colonialism - African Liberation Movements, leaders of independent African States as well as some Western writers to mention examples - have rejected this argument and have argued that only such assistance has been primarily responsible for the continuation of Portuguese rule in Africa. For an example of this argumentation as expounded by Western writers see William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the World, Penguin Africa Library, London, 1972. For a point of view of African Statesmen, a lucid example would be President Nyerere's statement before the Silver Jubilee Commemorative Session of the UN in the General Assembly on October 15, 1970 (J.K. Nyerere, FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, p. 204-212.

a blasphemy by the Portuguese authorities. The regime of Caetano, like that of his predecessor Antonio Salazar, was determined to stay in Africa even at the expense of more than a decade of extremely costly colonial war and the resultant increasingly international isolating position within the sphere of international affairs and diplomacy. Proclaiming its pride in its centuries-old "Civilizing Mission", but faced with an increasing intensity of the colonial people's struggle, metropolitan Portugal had to spend close to a half of its national budget in a futile attempt to preserve indefinitely a draining colonial war.²

Currently, all this has become history. For as the years passed by, it became increasingly obvious that either the Caetano dictatorship would change its African policy or be broken by it. Since Caetano adamantly rejected ^{a fundamental} ~~to change the~~ ⁱⁿ colonial policy, "the dictatorship and the policy went down together" on April 25, 1974.³

The new elite in Portugal have not only accepted the principle of decolonization. They have in fact started in earnest to put the principle into practice. Pursuant to negotiations held first in London and subsequently in Algiers, the Algiers Accords were signed on August 26 between the Government of Portugal and the PAIGC, which provided for the de jure recognition by Portugal of the State of Guinea Bissau,⁴ and laid down a framework for the decolonization

2. UNA - USA, "Issues before the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", September 1974, New York, p. 59.

3. Ibid.

4. On September 24, 1973, the PAIGC had proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence which immediately received the recognition of Afro-Asian and Socialist States. For a text of the Proclamation and the Constitution of the Republic, see, Annexes I and II respectively of document of the UN General Assembly - Twenty-eight session, A/9196 of October 15, 1973. This Declaration of Independence was welcomed by the General Assembly in its resolution 3061- (XXVIII) of November 2, 1973, adopted by a majority of 93 votes to 7, with 30 abstentions.

of the Islands of Cape Verde.⁵

Mozambique now has a transitional government under FRELIMO's leadership and is expected to proceed to full independence on June 25, 1975 in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement of September 7, 1974.

Inspite of the complexity of the Angola situation due to "various factors, the principal one being the diversity - indeed the division among the necessary partners in negotiations (the Liberation Movements),⁶ separate negotiations have begun with the leaders of the two principal liberation movements, the MPLA under Agostini Neto, the FNLA under Holden Roberto as well as the third liberation movement - UNITA under Jonas J. Savimbi.⁷ Indeed, if the process of decolonization is still taking an uncertain course, it would seem that it is not because of the lack of political will on the part of the

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5. The Algiers Agreement has not been made public. But as subsequently confirmed (See A/9885), it provided ~~for~~ a framework for the decolonization on the islands. A referendum is expected to be held. Currently, negotiations are going on between the PAIGC and the Government of Portugal for creating a proper framework to implement the agreement. It is anticipated that a transitional government with PAIGC participation is to be formed shortly to prepare the necessary ground leading to the ultimate act of self-determination. (Source: Discussions with the Portuguese and Guinea Bissau Permanent Representatives at the United Nations).

attained It is important to observe that throughout the PAIGC-Portugal negotiations, the former had maintained the position that with respect to Guinea Bissau, what was required was the recognition and not the granting of independence since independence had already been ~~conquered~~ by the people when they declared it on September 24, 1973. It says something of the strength of the PAIGC bargaining position that Portugal eventually accepted this situation, when the then Head of State, President Spínola proclaimed the de jure recognition of Guinea Bissau in Lisbon on September 10, 1974. (New York Times, September 11, 1974).

6. Statement by Mario Soares, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1974. A/P.V.2239.
7. Reuters reported on November 19, that Major Ernesto Melo Antunes, Minister without Portfolio, and one of the chief independence negotiators of the Portuguese Government, began negotiations with Dr. Agostini Neto, President of MPLA in Algiers. At the same time Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares began talks (around Nov. 24) with the leaders of the FNLA in Kinshasa, Zaire. Similar contacts by Portuguese authorities with UNITA had been initiated. According to Portuguese officials, an attempt is being made to form a transitional government in Angola shortly. Source: Discussions with the Permanent Representative of Portugal at the United Nations. See also A/9885.

Portuguese Government. The contradictions - both within and among - the liberation movements have obviously a disruptive effect.⁸ Commenting on the dissension within the Angola's National Liberation Movements, the New York Times was not off the mark when it stated:

"It will be tragic if independence, for which some of the guerillas have fought for thirteen years, is held up indefinitely by ethnic antagonisms and struggles for temporary advantages among African leaders, all of whose talents will be needed for the difficult task of building an Angolan nation".⁹

Negotiations have also taken place between Portugal and the Liberation Movement of the Islands of Sao Tome and Principe¹⁰ - the Movimento de Libertacao de Sao Tome e Principe.

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8. The main antagonists are the MPLA and FNLA. Both these movements are recognized by the OAU - which has mandated the Presidents of Congo, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire to conciliate them. The efforts of these African Heads of State have so far proved *ineffective* abortive. And they have been complicated by the divisions within the MPLA itself. This movement which has been the main fighting force in Angola since the armed struggle began there in 1961, has found its effectiveness undermined in the last two years by factionalism. There are currently three groups within the movement. The dominant one led by the MPLA's Chief Agostini Neto. Then there is a section led by Central Committee member Daniel Chipenda. And lastly, there is the group led by Reverend Joquim Pinto de Andrade. The Summit meeting on the East, Central and Southern African States (Good neighbourly Conference) in Brazaville in August 1974, provided an occasion for mediation efforts. After prolonged negotiations, the Brazaville Agreement was signed by the movement. According to the Agreement, a political bureau and central committee would have been set up. All the three factions were to be equally represented. The movement's President would have remained - Agostini Neto with Chipenda and Andrade assuming positions of Vice-presidency. The Congress of the movement was to have been held after independence. This Agreement was considered a great breakthrough but it remained a paper agreement. Hardly had the ink dried, then Chipenda denounced it. In an angry editorial, the Tanzania Daily News of October 30, 1974, p. 1, denounced Chipenda as a traitor. *omit these details*
9. The New York Times, "Angola's Divided Blacks", Saturday, November 16, 1974.
10. See A/9885. These are the oldest Portuguese colonial possessions. Portugal first 'discovered' the Equatorial Islands of Sao Tome and Principe in 1470. The former was in fact to become a prosperous colony as a centre of slave trade between West Africa and the Americas. It was also an important producer of sugar.

Some of the details will distract the reader from your central arguments.

(MLSTP).¹¹

All these are dramatic events. By any standard, they constitute a revolution in themselves. They are events of far reaching significance to the process of decolonization in Africa. As the Secretary General of the United Nations aptly put it: "The dramatic change in policy by the new Government of Portugal towards its overseas territories has heightened prospects for the early completion of the decolonization process on the African continent".¹² And nowhere is this impact to be felt more than in Southern Africa. For the march towards decolonization in Mozambique and Angola constitutes, "the first major breach in the 'white redoubt' which has taken shape in southern African during the early 1960s to stem the march of decolonization and black majority rule".¹³ Portuguese decolonization is bound to affect radically the balance of forces in that area. The unfolding events will exert pressure on the remaining colonial and white dominated areas. In other words, the decolonization process in the Portuguese territories will generate momentum for change in Rhodesia, Namibia and even South Africa itself. To quote Kurt Waldheim: "Because of the close interrelationships between

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11. In a cable dispatched to the Chairman of the United Nations Committee of 24, the Secretary General of the MLSTP informed the Committee Chairman that negotiations between the liberation movement and the Portuguese Government would begin in Algiers on November 23, 1974. A/C.4/780 of November 18, 1974. These negotiations have now been concluded. The Islands are to be independent on July 12, 1975. A transitional Government will be formed to administer the Islands until full independence and elections would be held to elect a Constituent Assembly. The Agreement incorporating all this was signed in Algiers on November 26, 1974 between the Portuguese Government delegation led by Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, Minister for Inter-Territorial Co-ordination, the delegation of the MLSTP led by Miguel Trouvoada, Member of the Executive Committee in charge of Foreign relations. (The Tanzania Daily News, November 27, 1974).
12. Official Records of the General Assembly - Twenty-Ninth Session, Supplement No. IA (A/9601/Add.1) Introduction to the Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organization, August 1974, p. 6.
13. UNA - USA, op.cit., p. 56

while there are some interesting points on the first six pages, you should get into the analysis sooner.

the problems of Southern Africa, the transformation of the political scene in the Portuguese administered territories throws into sharp relief the remaining questions of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and the policies of apartheid".¹⁴

Aim and Scope of the Study

Start on a positive note
~~The purpose of this study is not simply to ask the rhetorical question how did it happen? Rather the inquiry aims at examining the causative factors as well as the consequential effects of Portuguese decolonization in Africa. Consideration will be given to the various factors that have contributed to this process.~~
Emphasis on Mozambique

Naturally, the April 25 coup in Portugal which overthrew the Caetano regime and brought into power the Junta of National Salvation will be an important point of focus since it was after that coup that the almost *rapid* ~~'incredible'~~ pace of decolonization has taken place. Yet that change of Government in Portugal must be viewed in its proper perspective. Note must be taken of the crucial role played by the Armed Forces Movement and other progressive forces inside Portugal. But, it is equally important to take account of the fact that the cause of the coup in Portugal "emanates from the futile colonial wars in Africa", and to realize that "the changes brought about by those who have taken power in Portugal were only made possible by the effectiveness, determination, resilience and sacrifice of the peoples in the Portuguese dominated territories and their national liberation movements".¹⁵ The role of the liberation movements will therefore be examined.

Provide a more succinct statement re: the will + determination of the liberation movements

14. A/9601/Add.1, p. 6.

15. Joint Statement (made on May 9, 1974) by the Chairman of the Special Committee of 24, the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia. A/AC.109/447

Of no less importance has been the part played by the international community. The collective decolonization¹⁶ approach has been brought into sharp focus since 1960 when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the historic Declaration on Decolonization. The United Nations system of organizations have been actively involved in support of the struggle for the freedom and independence of the people under Portuguese domination. This support has been significant for providing not only legitimacy to the liberation movements, but in giving them concrete practical assistance.

In order to confine the inquiry to manageable proportion, the process of decolonization in Mozambique will be focussed. Mozambique has been chosen for several reasons. It has some characteristics which are to be found in both Angola and Guinea Bissau - some of which are not common in respect of the other two territories. For example, like Guinea Bissau, (in the case of the PAIGC), Mozambique has in FRELIMO, a strong, unchallenged, effective and united liberation movement. No such united liberation movement exists in Angola. The unchallenged supremacy of the PAIGC in Guinea Bissau like that of FRELIMO in Mozambique was of crucial importance in considering the bargaining strategies of the two liberation movements vis-a-vis the Portuguese. In contrast, the Liberation Movements in Angola have no such leverage.

Unlike Guinea Bissau, but like Angola, Mozambique is of vital

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16. As defined by Mittleman^{el}, Collective Decolonization refers to "mutually sponsored efforts to coordinate indigenous resistance against colonial domination and the activities of various international support groups. It is the attempt to harmonize interests and to formulate an intergrated solution for to liquidating colonialism". See James H. Mittleman^{el}, "Collective Decolonization and the UN Committee of 24: A Study of ~~Transitional~~ Relations", Unpublished paper, Columbia University, New York, 1974, p. 4. *Transnational*

strategic importance in the Southern Africa situation. Similarly, third party economic and other interests are prevalent in both Mozambique and Angola but not so much in Guinea Bissau. The settler problem which is non-existent in Guinea Bissau is very evident in Mozambique though its magnitude is lesser than that of Angola. Thus, an inquiry into the decolonization process of Mozambique helps to give an insight ^{overview of the} ~~to the problems and prospects of the whole process~~ of Portuguese decolonization in Africa.¹⁷

This section requires greater focus. State the purposes (1, 2, 3....) or the main questions to be posed. Sum up your general argument. What the reader's appetite.

PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM: SOME BACKGROUND

reduce the sentences, simplify When the Government of President Spínola declared in unequivocal terms Portugal's acceptance of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations as an administering power, professed its readiness to implement the United Nations resolutions including General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) and pledged to cooperate with the Organization,¹⁸ it was undertaking a dramatic reversal of previous attitudes. Hitherto, Portugal's position has been to deny that she was under any obligations to transmit information to the Secretary General concerning her colonial possessions in accordance with

17. Another important reason for concentrating in Mozambique is that, at the time of preparing this study there is greater public knowledge of the negotiations that have taken place between the Portuguese Government and FRELIMO. The Lusaka Agreement itself has been published. Very little is publicly known as to the contents of the Algiers Agreement between the PAIGC and the Portuguese while the negotiations in Angola are still an unknown quantity.

18. See A/9694, S/11419.

article 73e of the Charter.¹⁹

Briefly put, Lisbon's position was that the Portuguese Constitution stipulated that the "overseas territories" are an integral part of Portugal's national territory. Portuguese spokesman ~~ad~~ ~~nauseam~~ referred to the "multiracial and pluricontinental character of the Portuguese Nation".

Writing to the Secretary General in 1956, Portugal put forward this notion by maintaining that it did not have any territories envisaged in Chapter XI of the Charter. The United Nations, however, had never accepted this position and has consistently challenged it because "Portugal had changed the designation of the colonies to territories before joining the United Nations and because despite the changes in terminology, the administrative, political and economic relationship of the territories to Portugal were such that they arbitrarily placed the indigenous inhabitants of the territories to a state of subordination".²⁰

In 1960, the General Assembly was more specific on this question. It determined that the territories under Portuguese Administration were "Non-self Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter" and called upon the Government of Portugal to recognize the people under its administration to self-determination and independence.²¹

19. Article 73e requires members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self Government. "To transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible for other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply".

20. A PRINCIPLE IN TORMENT II. The United Nations and Portuguese Administered Territories, Office of Public Information, New York, 1970, p. 6.

21. General Assembly Resolution 1524(XV) of December, 1960. Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 16, (A/4684).

Thereafter, the General Assembly has repeatedly made similar calls to Portugal. In 1961, the Assembly established a Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration.²² This Committee was later dissolved and its functions taken by the Special Committee of 24.²³

Portugal's refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of its colonial inhabitants to self-determination and independence forced the liberation movements in Africa to take up "an armed struggle for liberation".²⁴

These were the wars which precipitated the crisis within Portugal leading to the overthrowal of the Government of Prime Minister Caetano. The first armed uprising took place in Angola²⁵ and in Guinea Bissau²⁶ in 1961, to be followed by Mozambique in 1964.²⁷ In an attempt to contain the armed resistance, Portugal expanded its military machine beyond the means of the backward Portuguese economy. In 1960, that is before the liberation wars began, Portugal had some 80,000 men under arms and a total defence budget of \$93 million.²⁸ But by 1973, she had a modern military

22. General Assembly Resolution 1699(XVI) of December 19, 1961.

23. Officially known as the "Special Committee with regards to the implementation of the Declaration on the creating of Independence to colonial countries and peoples", the Committee was established by General Assembly Resolution 1654-(XVI) of November 27, 1961. For an interesting study of the Committee and its functions, see (i) Salim A. Salim, "The Committee of 24: Its Role in the Process of Decolonization", New York, 1973 (unpublished paper). (ii) James H. Mittelman, "Collective Decolonization and the UN Committee of 24: A Study of Transitional Relations", New York, 1974 (unpublished paper).

24. The Colonial Policy of Portugal working paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, A/AC.109/L.921, February 28, 1974, p. 2.

25. In 1961, the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) launched its armed struggle.

26. The armed resistance in Guinea Bissau was initiated by the Partido Africano de Independencia de Guine y Capo Verde (PAIGC) in January 1961.

27. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), began its armed struggle in September 1964.

28. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Communist Bloc and the Free World: The Military Balance 1960, London, 1960, p. 11.

establishment with more than 200,000 men under arms and a defence budget of \$425 million. This is to say that, in the period of thirteen years, there has been an increase ~~to the tune of~~ about 400 per cent.²⁹ ~~Of significant relevance to our inquiry is the fact that~~ out of these troops, Portugal had deployed about 142,000 in Africa to combat the nationalist forces.³⁰

Yet despite this massive utilization of Portugal's defence potential to contain the war and notwithstanding the support she received from some of her allies, Portugal was ~~not~~ able to win the colonial war against the 'insurgents'. In an analysis made by one of Britain's analysts and published in 1971 by the London based Institute for the Study of Conflict, Portugal's ability to maintain its colonial rule in Africa was seriously questioned.³¹ *omit*

While Portugal was meeting with military reverses in her colonies especially in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, her diplomatic position internationally assumed the proportion of almost total isolation.

The United Nations which 1965 had recognized the legitimacy of armed struggle, had followed this up by actively supporting the national liberation movements. The specialized agencies were called upon to pursue this support on two levels. On the one hand, they were to cease collaboration with the Government of Portugal for as long as that regime refused to recognize the right of the peoples under her domination to self-determination and independence. On the

29. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974, London, 1973, p. 24.

30. John Gomiond, "Portugal's Colonies: Echoes of Another Century", The New York Times, Sunday, November 4, 1973.

31. William Gutteridge, "The Coming Confrontation in Southern Africa", CONFLICT STUDIES Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1971.

*also note the
role of NGO's*

other hand, the agencies were called upon to provide assistance to the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau to assist them in reconstruction programmes in the liberated areas.³²

Furthermore, by 1972, the United Nations had taken a definite position to recognize the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde "as the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the peoples of the territories". And it recommended that pending their accession to independence, "all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and the United Nations bodies concerned should, when dealing with matters pertaining to the territories to ensure the representation of those territories by the liberation movements concerned in an appropriate capacity and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity".³³

Significantly, this position of the United Nations followed a successful and dramatic visit of a UN Special Mission to the liberated areas of Guinea Bissau in April 1972. That visit undertaken at the invitation of the PAIGC despite Portugal's opposition, effectively challenged the Portuguese claims of being in "effective control of the territory". It is also substantiated the claims of the liberation movement on the existence of the liberated areas.³⁴

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32. Many agencies responded to the call for the discontinuance of collaboration including UNESCO, ICAO, ITU, WMO, WHO, IMCO, W.F.P. and FAO. Assistance has also been rendered by UNESCO and W.F.P. among others. Since 1967, the role of the specialized agencies in supporting decolonization has assumed importance. For information on how the agencies have operated in this context, see for example, Official Records of the Twenty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly. Report of the Special Committee (A/9023/RW.1) Chapter VI. See also Report of the Special Committee A/9623, (Part VII). See also A/9638 and Addenda.
33. General Assembly Resolution 2918(XXVII) adopted on November 14, 1972.
34. For a report of the Mission, see Document A/AC.109/804 of July 3, 1972.

All the afore-mentioned factors would seem to testify to the untenability of the Portuguese colonial situation. Furthermore, while facing increasing resistance by the liberation movements and confronted with mounting international opposition, Portugal was meeting with dissension from within. Even within the armed forces, resistance was evident. Thus for example, the Voice of the Deserter, published by the Paris based Comite de 'Apoio dos Desetores' e Retractorious Portugueses (Committee of Support to Portuguese Deserters and Draft Evaders) reported that in 1973 the number of deserters was estimated at 100,000.³⁵

III

THE APRIL 25 COUP AND PORTUGAL'S COLONIAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT

The failure of the regime to put an end to the armed resistance after thirteen years of warfare eroded the combat morale of the Portuguese armed forces.³⁶ It also severely affected the Portuguese economy³⁷ and, above all, created division within the political and military superstructure.³⁸ Space does not permit us to go into an analysis of the events surrounding the dismissal of General Antonio de Spinola and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Costa

35. A/AC.109/L.921, p. 10.

36. The disenchantment was particularly evident among the young officers who felt that they would be unfairly blamed for military failures against the liberation movements. This made the officers not only question Caetano's colonial policies, but also the legitimacy of the regime itself. The OBSERVER, London May 19, 1974.

37. The New York Times of April 26, 1974 among others reported on how the structure and trends of the Portuguese economy was being affected. The serious inflationary trends making its inflation the highest in Europe was a case in point.

38. This became more pronounced when the much decorated General Spinola published his book on February 22, 1974, Portugal and the Future.

Gomez and the subsequent appointment of an extremely conservative officer, General Joaquim da Luz Cunha as the Chief of Staff.³⁹ It must be pointed out, however, that these events as well as the subsequent struggle in the aftermath of April 25, for supremacy between the progressive sectors of the Armed Forces Movement, which in fact staged the coup, and the conservative high ranking military officers has direct relevance to the pace of decolonization.

Immediately following the coup, the Movement of the Armed Forces announced the formation of the Junta of National Salvation on April 25.⁴⁰ General Spínola assumed the Presidency and Prime Minister Palma Carlos headed the Provisional Government.

Both these men are of conservative background and orientation. And it is significant to note that though the dissatisfaction with the colonial war was what essentially precipitated the coup, General Spínola was still determined to maintain Portugal's colonial presence using different techniques and terminology. In his first interview with the press, Spínola stipulated that self-determination was not to be confused with independence and emphatically rejected the notion of independence for the colonies.⁴¹ Indeed, Spínola was to pursue this course of action for quite some time before he was obviously 'compelled' to abide by the position of the Armed Forces Movement and other anti-colonial forces within the new Government of Portugal,

39. For some background information on these developments as also the position of Caetano and the pressure he was subjected to by the ultra conservative forces leading him to dismiss Spínola, See New York Times, March 15, 1974, New York Times, March 13, 1974, New York Times, March 16, 1974. Notícia de Portugal, No. 1401, March 9, 1974. Sunday Times, London, April 28, 1974. Le Monde, Paris, March 17-18, 1974.

40. The London Times, April 26, 1974

41. The New York Times, April 28, 1974, The London Times, April 28, 1974.

the socialists and communists among others. Throughout this period, Spinola ~~was advocating and persisting in~~^{ed} the promotion of his conceptions of a lusitanian federation.⁴²

Thus, though the new regime declared as its objective the negotiated settlement of its African conflicts, it was evident from the statements⁴³ of its highest leaders that the policy was at best ambiguous and at worst calculated to maintain Portuguese colonialism in other forms. At the same time however, there were signs that even amongst the ranks of the Government, there were those who did not share the point of view of General de Spínola. The Minister for Inter-territorial Co-ordination, ~~Mr.~~ Almeida Santos, for example, while stating that self-determination was the aim of the Government

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42. The New York Times, April 30, 1974. This position of Spínola was in line with the philosophical approach enunciated in his book. In the Portugal and the Future, Spínola, had put forward three principal concepts as an alternative to the Statusquo:

- I) Independence cannot be granted to the colonies in Africa as it would extremely weaken Portugal. ("The overseas territories are a prerequisite for our survival as a free and independent nation. Without the African territories, the country will be reduced to a voiceless corner of a gigantic Europe and will have no possible trump card to play to assert itself in the concert of nations. It will end having a merely formal existence in a political framework where its real independence will be totally jeopardized").
- II) Self-determination will be accorded on the understanding that the population of the territories would take part in the choice of internal policy options and not in external policy.
- III) The ultimate structure so contemplated would be a federation in which theoretically Portugal and the territories would be equal members. Portuguese economic interests would at the same time be protected.

(From the Synopsis of the book, Portugal and the Future, prepared by Dr. Roger Monteiro of the UN Secretariat in a Discussion Group of the Book organized by UNITAR in May 1974, in which the author of the present inquiry participated in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee of 24).

43. General Francisco Costa Gomez, Vice President of the Junta of National Salvation (later to succeed Spínola as President of the Republic) in his statement of May 6, 1974 while appealing to the liberation movements to lay down their arms made it quite clear that Portugal was in no mood to accept total and unconditional independence of the territories under the leadership of the National Liberation Movements. (Summary of World Broadcast of May 8, 1974).

declared that independence was not excluded.⁴⁴ The differences were to assume sharp proportion as the Armed Forces Movement pressed for a programme of total decolonization while the conservative leadership headed by General Spínola resisted.

Confronted with a rather prevaricating position of the new Government on the question of decolonization, the response of the liberation movements was predictable. FRELIMO, in a statement issued on April 27 welcoming the changes in Portugal, emphatically declared: "Just as Caetano's era clearly demonstrated that liberal fascism does not exist, it must also be understood that there is no such thing as democratic colonialism". Reiterating the movement's demand of total and complete independence as a sine qua non, for peace in Mozambique, the Executive Committee rebuffed Spínola's proposal of a federation: "We are not fighting to become Portuguese with black skins"⁴⁵ (emphasis added). In its statement of May 6, 1974, the PAIGC Executive Committee called upon Portugal (a) to recognize the independence of Guinea Bissau, (b) to recognize the right of the people of Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence and (c) to recognize the same right for the people of other Portuguese colonies. The PAIGC Executive then called upon the authorities in Portugal to start immediate negotiations for the implementation of the afore-mentioned three principles.⁴⁶

The Frente Nacional para a Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) in a statement issued from the Movement's Headquarters in Kinshasa on

44. Noticias e Factos, May 22, 1974; Manchester Guardian, May 22, 1974; Provincia de Angola, May 27, 1974.

45. Statement by the Frelimo Executive Committee on the Events in Portugal, April 27, 1974. A/AC.109/L.942 of May 1974, p. 3-4.

46. Statement by the Executive Committee of the Struggle of PAIGC, May 6, 1974.

April 27, condemned what it termed "the so-called multi-racial policy flaunted by the Portuguese military Junta" in regard to its African colonies, describing it as "a new-colonialist manoeuvre aimed at perpetuating the superiority of the white race over the black race and keeping the Angolans in an inferior position". The FNLA then vowed that "Angolans who have been oppressed for five centuries and deprived of their personality, have to continue to take up arms to regain their right to live and (maintain) their personality".⁴⁷ In a statement issued on May 7, the President of the MPLA, Dr. Neto rejected categorically the federation formula proposed by Spínola and emphasized that complete independence is the only principle on which the MPLA was prepared to base Angola's cooperation with other countries - Portugal included. While expressing its readiness to negotiate, the MPLA leader pledged that "Our people's struggle on all fronts will continue until liberation is achieved."⁴⁸

The neighbours of Angola and Mozambique,⁴⁹ the OAU Liberation Committee,⁵⁰ the Organization of African

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47. Statement by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) on April 27, 1974.
 48. Statement by Dr. Agostini Neto, President of the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola MPLA, May 7, 1974.
 49. In a joint declaration on May 9, 1974, the Foreign Minister of Congo, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia while noting that the military Junta in Portugal had not stated categorically its recognition for self-determination and independence of its colonies, "warned the Spínola regime that the time has come for categorical and unconditional declaration that Portugal accepts in principle, complete national independence for Angola, Guinea Bissau (and Cape Verde) and Mozambique". The Foreign Ministers in the meantime pledged the commitment of their respective governments "in toto to ensure intensification of the armed struggle". The Daily News, Tanzania, May 10, 1974, p. 1
 50. The 23rd Session of the OAU Liberation Committee held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in May 1974 pledged its continued support for the armed struggle in the Portuguese dominated territories.

Unity⁵¹ and the United Nations⁵² took the side of the liberation movements and called upon Portugal not to equivocate on the issue of decolonization.

Perhaps partly due to the determination of the liberation movements, partly due to the pressure of the international community, and partly due to the ultimate assertion of the pro-decolonization forces within Portugal⁵³ as represented by the progressive forces of the Armed Forces Movement and supported by the parties of the left, the Government of Portugal ultimately came out with a clear and firm commitment favouring decolonization.⁵⁴ With this unequivocal

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51. In a Declaration issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its eleventh ordinary session held in Mogadishu, Somalia, from June 12 - 15, 1974, the African leaders noted that the Portuguese Government "had not yet undertaken any commitment" with regard to the decolonization of the African colonies. The Summit therefore called upon Portugal to recognize the principle of total decolonization, and hold negotiations with the African Liberation Movements for the implementation of that principle. OAU Resolution CM/ST/13 (XXIII), Mogadishu, June 1974.
52. In a statement issued on May 17, 1974, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim expressed the hope that "the new Government of Portugal will recognize the right of the peoples in the territories to self-determination and independence and that it will, for this purpose, begin negotiations with the African Liberation Movements concerned without delay so that peace may be restored. A/9623/Add.1 (Part I), para 21. In their joint statement of May 9, 1974, the three presiding officers of the Committee of 24, Committee on Apartheid and UN Council for Namibia called upon Portugal to avoid ambiguities and to proceed forthwith towards total decolonization. A/AC.109/447.
53. On July 11, 1974, the Government of Prime Minister Adelino de Palma Carlos resigned. The departure of Carlos was considered a blow to the Conservatives and to General Spínola in particular. A new Government under Colonel Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves was appointed on July 13. The new Prime Minister is one of the leaders of the Movement of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, in the new Cabinet, there were in addition to the Prime Minister, three other officers of the Political Co-ordination - Commission of the Movement of the Armed Forces. *style?* Among whom was major Ernesto Augusto de Melo Antunes. Major Antunes, who assumed the position of a Minister without Portfolio is a man of *left wing* *vague* ideas. He was to play a key role in the negotiations with FRELIMO.
54. In a statement to the Nation on July 27, 1974, President Spínola announced Portugal's recognition of the right of self-determination and independence. Earlier on July 24, the Council of State of Portugal approved the amendment to Article I of the Country's 1933 Constitution thus facilitating the recognition of the right of the colonial possessions to self-determination and independence. Portugal also accepted her obligations as an administering power, declared its acceptance of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples. (See A/9694, S/11419).

rephrase -
awkward

commitment, what followed then was the bargaining strategies between her and the liberation movements, taking into account that circumstances and situations varied from one territory to another.

IV

DECOLONIZATION OF MOZAMBIQUE: SOME BACKGROUND

The Mozambican situation typifies the evolution of Portugal's decolonization policy in the context of the victory of the forces for decolonization over the forces opposed to decolonization among the new ruling elite in Lisbon. For the purpose of this inquiry we shall refer ^{to} the former as minimalists and the latter as the maximalists. The Lusaka Agreement of September 7, 1974 testifies to this. The maximalists, the forces of the right, whose most important spokesman in the wake of the coup was General Sp^{l.}inola himself, attempted different manoeuvres to preempt the decolonization of the territory⁵⁵. Their aim was clearly to retain Mozambique under

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55. General Sp^{l.}inola resigned as President of Portugal on September 30. General Costa Gomez was sworn in as the new President on September 30. In his address to the nation, General Gomez made an oblique reference to the position of the maximalists when he asserted: "In the era of decolonization, there was some deviation from the Programme of Armed Forces Movement". ("Speech delivered by H.E. General Francisco Da Costa Gomez on taking office as President of the Republic of Portugal", Press Release No. 9, October 3, 1974, issued by the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the UN, p. 2). The irony of the situation is that General Costa Gomez is himself considered to be of conservative beliefs and was in fact earlier on clearly displaying views similar to those of Sp^{l.}inola. Had he then been converted to the views of the young officers of the Movement of Armed Forces? Has he simply decided to play it safe in order not to allow the young officers to have a total control of the situation and may therefore at an appropriate moment join hands with those like Sp^{l.}inola whose beliefs and views he apparently seemed to have shared? Only events will tell. For the purpose of this study however, it is sufficient to state that the new President seems to have accepted the views of the minimalists with respect to the decolonization of the Portuguese dominated territories. It must at the same time be pointed out that though the Lusaka Agreement came into being during the Sp^{l.}inola Presidency, it is reliably understood that the former Commander in Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Guinea Bissau did his utmost to preempt that Agreement. (Source: Discussion with FRELIMO officials as well as certain officials of the Portuguese Administration).

some form of Portugal's control. Thus, while the struggle for power was still undecided within Portugal, negotiations with the Mozambican Liberation Movement did not make much headway.

The position of the minimalists as represented by the Movement of the Armed Forces and the forces of the left, was to press for total decolonization. They accepted the authenticity of the liberation movement and were pressing for negotiations which would culminate in the eventual transfer of power to the representatives of the ^{FRELIMO} ~~liberation movement~~ and the disengagement of the Portuguese armed forces.

These were two clearly divergent positions. The fact that they were upheld by the very elements who were in power in the "new Portugal" serves to illustrate the complex power set-up that came into being immediately after the coup.

It has already been stated that it was the colonial war which precipitated the coup in Portugal. It should now be pointed out that the success or failure of the bargaining strategies on the issue of decolonization adopted by both the maximalists and the minimalists depended on the developments in the colonies. More specifically, the degree of strength, determination and effectiveness of the liberation movements in the territories strengthened or weakened one or the other side of the internal power structure of the metropole. Thus, a united, unchallenged, popular and fighting liberation movement strengthened the minimalists' position, while the proliferation of movements claiming legitimacy would tend to favour the maximalists. Let us now examine how this applied in the case of Mozambique.

The Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) came into

existence on June 25, 1962. On September 24, 1964, it launched its armed struggle against the Portuguese army. In ~~the~~ thirteen years, it has grown into a nationwide, strong and effective liberation movement. It developed from a movement only able to initiate minor skirmishes to a fighting force capable of launching major onslaughts against the Portuguese forces. By 1973, FRELIMO was operating in different regions of Mozambique. What is more significant, the liberation movement was operating in the very heartland of Mozambique far from the borders of either Tanzania or Mozambique.⁵⁶ To be able to 'contain' the situation Portugal deployed about 60,000 troops in the territory.⁵⁷

The following table showing operations undertaken by the Portuguese authorities against the 'insurgents' for a period of two and half years, demonstrates the intensity of the colonial war effort.

MOZAMBIQUE: PORTUGUESE MILITARY OPERATIONS 1971-1973⁵⁸

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (only to June)
Land Operations	3,657	6,038	4,202
Air Missions	14,398	15,461	8,697
Naval Missions	675	627	381
Troops carried by air due to conditions of warfare	3,223	3,344	1,056
Psychological Warfare:			
Flight hours	1,417	2,285	963
Number of Pamphlets dropped	2,184,250	4,889,100	2,450,000

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56. For a more recent report outlining FRELIMO military operations, see MOZAMBIQUE, Working paper prepared by the UN Secretariat, A/AC.109/L.919/Add, pp. 4-8.
57. Neil Bruce, "Portugal's African Wars", Conflict Studies, No. 34, March 1973, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, p. 32. Other estimates put the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique at about 70,000.
58. Source: Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, July 4, 1973 as reproduced in A/AC.109/-L.919, p.9.

It should be observed that these were figures published by the Portuguese authorities and as with any warfare, they are unlikely to be the real facts. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that they are very conservative estimates; the actual figures are likely to be much higher. And yet, even these clearly demonstrate the magnitude of the Portuguese war effort, and Portugal was nonetheless unable to defeat FRELIMO. Indeed, by 1973, the Movement had established several liberated zones, freeing over one fourth of the territory from Portuguese control and exercising sovereignty over one million inhabitants.⁵⁹ Furthermore, FRELIMO's influence went far beyond these areas. While making life very insecure for the Portuguese authorities, the Movement's underground network among the Mozambican masses was gaining in momentum by the day. *Be more specific about organization*

The White settlers⁶⁰ in Mozambique expressed increasing anxiety at Portugal's inability to provide them with protection. One of their spokesmen, Mr. Goncindo Merquitela complained in the National Assembly in Lisbon: "Our losses in goods and human lives in Mozambique have never been so high. The general climate is deteriorating and people are worried".⁶¹

The Portuguese military command devised various strategies in an attempt to defeat the insurgents. These, however, proved abortive. Indeed, 1973 saw the downfall of the man who had severally boasted of his determination to push the guerillas upwards the Ruvuma. The

59. A/AC.109/L.919, p. 3.

60. Currently the white settler population is estimated to be 240,000. These are only rough figures. For the statistics on ethnic origin have not been published since 1960. According to 1970 provisional census figures total population of Mozambique was 8,233,834. (A/AC.109/L.919, p. 3) The white population is mainly concentrated in the southern part of Mozambique.

61. A/AC.109/L.921, p. 10.

replacement of General Kaulza de Arriaga, a vigorous exponent of Portuguese colonial military occupation in July 1973, by General Thomas Jose Bastos Machados as Commander in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Mozambique⁶² was a clear admission of the failure of the Portuguese war effort in the territory.

FRELIMO's victories both at the military and political fronts were made possible by the determination of the overwhelming majority of the leadership and rank and file to close ranks and forge a united front despite attempts to divide the Movement made by at least one of its former leaders.⁶³

At the International level, FRELIMO became the only liberation movement in Mozambique with broad international recognition. The OAU accepted it as the sole liberation movement and the United Nations reinforced the movement's legitimacy when the world body accorded the movement exclusive recognition as the "authentic representative" of the people of Mozambique.⁶⁴ Furthermore, in terms of its operational facilities, FRELIMO had the unqualified support of both Zambia and Tanzania. FRELIMO's headquarters were and still are in Dar es Salaam. President Nyerere, for example, succinctly explained Tanzania's role

62. A/AC.109/L.921, p. 9.

63. Subsequent to the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first President in Dar es Salaam on February 3, 1969, the Movement had a collective leadership of three, namely, Samora Machel, Marcelino Dos Santos and Urio Simango. The last mentioned who had been Vice-President under Mondlane resigned from the Movement when upon Mondlane's death he was not made President. Samora became President and Dos Santos Vice-President. Significantly, Simango's departure had no impact on the movement. He exiled himself from one African capital to another. He then turned up in Mozambique just after the coup and joined the forces with COREMO, a movement which has never been taken seriously by the OAU. ~~But like COREMO itself, Simango was a spent force!~~

64. General Assembly Resolution 2918(XXVII) of November 14, 1972.

in support of FRELIMO as that of acting as a "rear base".⁶⁵

The other liberation movement in Mozambique - the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) was no match for FRELIMO. It is a tiny organization with very limited national adherents. It has no international standing though at one time it received some assistance from the Peoples Republic of China and was occasionally allowed to operate in Zambia.

When therefore, the April coup took place, FRELIMO was in a position of unparalleled supremacy both internally and internationally. Its reaction and position could not be ignored by the new elite. Indeed, the crucial fact was that FRELIMO was at the peak of its military successes. A major offensive was in the offing.⁶⁶ FRELIMO not only threatened to continue the war if the new leaders failed to recognize the right of Mozambicans to independence.⁶⁷ The Movement in fact kept up the military pressure, blowing up trains and conquering more territory.

It is undeniable that the increasing strength of FRELIMO had the effect of mounting further pressure on the ruling elite in Lisbon. More specifically, it strengthened the position of the minimalists. For they could argue that as long as the war waged, one of the fundamental objectives of the coup - the ending of the war and the realization of a negotiated settlement remained an illusion. If the war

65. President Nyerere's address at the Mass Rally held at the Salvador Allende School on the Alamar Housing Project, Havana, Cuba, September 21, 1974. GRANMA, Weekly Review Official Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, September 29, 1974, p. 5.

66. Discussion with FRELIMO leaders in Dar es Salaam. *indicate date*

67. In their April 27 statement, the Executive Committee of FRELIMO made it clear that the end of the colonial war could only be realized through the recognition of the right to independence of the Mozambican people under the leadership of FRELIMO. The statement emphasized that the Mozambicans were a people with a distinct political, cultural and social personality which could only be attained through the country's independence. A/AC.109/L.942, May 1974.

continued, the credibility of the April 25 movement would suffer seriously. The Portuguese people, as indeed the Portuguese armed forces, were, ~~very~~ tired of the war.

The Spinolas ^{revised} attempted an alternative to overcome FRELIMO's ^{evidence?} claims to supremacy. Official encouragement ^{substantiated} was given to various groupings in Mozambique to form political parties. These groups - the most prominent of which was Grup Unidade Mocambique (GUMO) were actually intended to provide a forum for a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to the maximalists.⁶⁸ Briefly put, it was the hope of the maximalists that the mushrooming political groups would, by their demand of local autonomy with continued membership of the "Portuguese Community", provide an effective challenge to FRELIMO's "uncompromising" demand for independence. And if power were then to be handed over to the puppet groupings, Portuguese economic interests in the territory would be securely protected. But FRELIMO's capabilities of not only retaining its strength but indeed increasing its operations ^{and} confounded this strategy. Consequently, the minimalists were able to prevail on Spínola and his colleagues to abandon their maximalist position.

The subsequent tactic used by the maximalists was to try and prevent FRELIMO from exercising exclusive, or for that matter, dominant

68. GUMO was established during the Caetano era. It was in favour of increasing autonomy of the territory within the context of existing political institutions. It is essentially a middle class organization and was led by Maximo Dias, Joao Simeao and Jorge de Abreu. (Noticias Laurencio Marques, April 29, 1974) But by July this year there were reports that the Organization had decided to terminate all activities in favour of a united approach to the decolonization of Mozambique under FRELIMO's leadership. (A.F.P. No. 2085 of July 9, 1974). Other Organizations included the Frente de Independencia e Continuidade Ocidental (FICO). This group vehemently opposed independence and supported the Spínola formula of a federation. It is an organization which drew its support mainly from Beira settlers and retired military men.

power. To deprive the liberation movement of a monopoly of power, the Portuguese authorities were devising techniques of power distribution among the various groups - patent, but futile attempts, to render FRELIMO as just one of the multitudes! To achieve this, the authorities ~~concerned~~ ^{delay} attempted to ~~procrastinate~~ the negotiations while hoping to reinforce the various groupings inside Mozambique so that the latter could provide a justifiable claim of representativity. But FRELIMO's vigilancy manifested both in the intensive politicalization of the masses and the re-^{vitalization} ~~invigoration~~ of the armed confrontation defeated this rear guard action of the maximalists in Lisbon.

The negotiations

On May 6, 1974, General Francisco Costa Gomez, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Vice-President of the Junta of National Salvation, while on visit to Angola, called on the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies to stop the fighting. Speaking in Luanda, the Portuguese leader couched his ceasefire appeal in the following terms:

✓ "In the name of liberated Portugal, I appeal to the liberation movements to:

✓ "Let us lay down our arms and use the new possibilities made available by the liberal atmosphere in which we are living in Portugal; let us allow the people to make a free choice regarding their destiny and their authentic self-determination.

✓ "If such 'movements' are really the expression of the will of the people - as they claim - let them leave the clandestine operations, their headquarters beyond the borders and their weapons and let them come and fight democratically with words, ideas, political doctrines and through their legal political participation prove that they are effectively the authentic expression of the will of the people overseas".⁶⁹

69. Provincia de Angola, May 6, 1974, The New York Times, May 7, 1974.

And on May 11, 1974, while on visit to Mozambique, General Costa Gomez followed up the call with a threat of increasing warfare if the ceasefire appeal was not heeded ~~to~~ by the liberation movement.⁷⁰

This insistence on the ceasefire was to be an operational guideline for the Portuguese negotiators in the early stages of negotiations between the Portuguese Government and FRELIMO. Indeed, prior to the commencement of the formal negotiations in Lusaka on June 5, 1974, the Portuguese authorities had maintained what can only be described as a hard (and which proved to be a futile) line on this question. Thus, for example, General Costa Gomez was reported to have declared on May 8:

"FRELIMO, or any other (so-called) emancipalist party can freely establish itself in the territories of Angola, Mozambique or Portuguese Guinea provided they cease their war operations. As long as war operations are not stopped we naturally cannot accept them as parties on the same conditions as other political parties".⁷¹

FRELIMO totally ignored this demand. And the movement's leadership consistently maintained the position that the ceasefire cannot be treated in isolation. It can only form part of the framework of an overall political solution to the conflict. FRELIMO furthermore, equally threatened that if the Portuguese government failed to recognize the principle of independence for the people of Mozambique, then it would intensify its armed struggle.

Clearly, with these two contradictory positions, the prospects for meaningful negotiations remained uncertain, to say the least. Students of the problem were not particularly surprised therefore when the Joint Communiqué⁷² issued, following the formal

70. The New York Times, May 12, 1974.

71. Summary of World Broadcasts of May 8, 1974.

72. For full Text of the Communiqué, see Annex I attached.

talks⁷³ held in Lusaka on June 5-6, 1974, demonstrated that the talks had to be adjourned due to lack of agreement.

These initial negotiations provided an opportunity for a clearer understanding of each other's position. Furthermore, there was an agreement on one point which, taken in the context of the background of the Portuguese position, would seem to be an important gain for the FRELIMO position. The Communique had stated that "the two delegations recognized that the establishment of a ceasefire depends on prior global agreement related to fundamental political principles". Considering General Costa Gomez's previous statements and implied threats, this clearly represented an indication for a softening of the Portuguese position.

The June Lusaka talks, like the subsequent formal negotiations in September, were held in Camera. But from the discussions with both FRELIMO and Portuguese sources, it can be concluded that during the Lusaka negotiations, Portugal was not prepared to discuss substantive issues of decolonization. Instead, her main pre-occupation was to discuss the ceasefire. Considering that at that time the Portuguese Government had not yet clearly defined its decolonization policy, it

73. The Lusaka negotiations were held following contacts made by the Portuguese Government through both the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia acting as intermediaries to facilitate contacts with FRELIMO. These contacts were made while negotiations with the PAIGC were still going on in London in May 1974. The FRELIMO delegation to the talks was led by the Movement's President Mr. Samora Machel and included Mr. Joaquim Chissano, Chief representative in Tanzania; Mr. Alberto Chipenda, deputy Secretary, Defence; Mr. Oscar Monteiro, Deputy Secretary for External Affairs and incharge of the Publicity Section; Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Chief representative, Zambia; Mr. Jacint Veloso, member of FRELIMO Office in Algiers; Mr. Gideon Mombeira, Secretary for Department of Education and Culture and Mr. Daniel Mbaze, Deputy Director, Mozambican Institute, Dar es Salaam.

The Portuguese delegation was led by Foreign Minister Mario Soares and included Major Otelo de Carvalho, Member of the Movement of the Armed Forces and Dr. Hope San-Machado, official of the Foreign Office. (The Zambian Times and the Zambian Daily News, June 5 and 6, 1974 *Were Antunios and Almeida Santos not present?*)

was not difficult to comprehend why the Portuguese delegation preferred to discuss what FRELIMO regarded as a peripheral question rather than to discuss the substantive problems deemed as such by FRELIMO. What were the substantive issues?

The principal issue, as maintained by FRELIMO, was the independence of Mozambique and the concomitant modalities for achieving this objective. FRELIMO's three fundamental principles⁷⁴ as presented at the negotiations can be summarized as follows:

- i) Portugal should unequivocally recognize the right of the people of Mozambique to independence.
- ii) Portugal should recognize FRELIMO as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people and
- iii) Portugal should agree on the principle of the transfer of power to the Mozambican people under the leadership of FRELIMO.

The Portuguese objected to the principle of the transfer of power to FRELIMO. They argued that FRELIMO was the representative of only a section of the Mozambican population. They alleged that while the Movement had support in the northern part, its support in the south was insignificant. The Portuguese also proposed that there should be a referendum in the territory on the question of independence and related matters. Portugal's position on the question

74. Source: Discussions with FRELIMO leaders. It is important to point out here that FRELIMO put forward these same proposals to the UN Secretary-General when the FRELIMO representative Mr. Chissano saw the Secretary General of the United Nations on July 23, 1974. This meeting took place on the eve of Kurt Waldheim's official visit to Lisbon. The FRELIMO delegate was accompanied by Mr. Mark Chona, Personal Assistant of President Kaunda and the Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the UN (OPI Press Release, SG/SM.2020, July 23, 1974).

of a referendum was emphasized both at the June Lusaka meetings and reiterated in subsequent public statements.

FRELIMO categorically rejected the idea of referendum on the ground that it was an insult to the Mozambican people to ask them whether or not they wanted independence! What were they fighting for all the last ten years of armed struggle?⁷⁵ FRELIMO equally rejected Portugal's claim of the non-popularity of the organization in the south. They termed this a mere gimmick to prop up artificial groups.

Subsequent to the adjournment of the Lusaka meetings, secret negotiations ~~later~~ took place in Dar es Salaam. These negotiations which took place towards the end of August, were carried out on the Portuguese side by Major Antunes, the Minister without Portfolio. But, by this time a number of issues had been clarified. Most importantly, the minimalists had prevailed over the maximalists and General Spínola had made the historic July 25th statement declaring Portugal's acceptance of the right of the colonial people to self-determination and independence.

All the necessary conditions had been prepared for the Lusaka Accords. Portugal dropped its insistence of the referendum. She had also ceased using "scare

75. The FRELIMO leader, Mr. Machel had in fact made his organization's position publicly clear before the talks began. FRELIMO, he had said on arrival in Lusaka, would not negotiate the question of independence, for Mozambican independence was an inalienable right of the Mozambican people and was therefore not negotiable. FRELIMO would negotiate the machinery for the transfer of power to the people of Mozambique and would demand the recognition by Portugal of the independence of Mozambique, he asserted. The Times of Zambia, June 4, 1974.

tactics".⁷⁶ The Lusaka Agreement of September 7, 1974 was by any standards a total victory for FRELIMO. It was at the same time the positive culmination of the efforts of the pro-decolonization forces in Metropolitan Portugal, the minimalists. Signed by Samora Machel on behalf of FRELIMO and by Mario Soares with his collaborators on behalf of Portugal, the Agreement⁷⁷ provided for the transfer of power in Mozambique to an independent government led by FRELIMO. It specifically provided for:

- (i) Mozambique to be an independent State on June 25, 1975 (the date coinciding with the founding of FRELIMO).
- (ii) The formation of a transitional government⁷⁸ in the interim period dominated by FRELIMO. (There was to be a High Commissioner appointed by the Portuguese Government and a Prime Minister designated by FRELIMO and nine Cabinet Ministers. Of these, six were to be FRELIMO appointees, and three by Portugal. *I believe that Portugal originally bargained for a 50-50 arrangement*)
- (iii) That between the time the Agreement came into force until independence, Portugal would undertake to safeguard the territorial integrity of the territory.

76. Among them were two. Firstly, *reword* a lot of emphasis was made to the possibilities of tribal chaos in Mozambique in the event of a FRELIMO take-over. The maximalists had sought to dramatize the element of tribal loyalties even predicting the revolt of the Wamakuwa. It was said privately by some Portuguese officials that unless precaution and extra vigilance was taken, there was the danger of the "Congolization" of the territory.

The second tactic was to overplay the possibility of South African intervention. In this context the expected opposition of some of the white settlers was deliberately emphasized and it was argued that the South Africans would actively support a UDI-Rhodesian style in Mozambique.

77. For a full text of the Lusaka Agreement, see Annex II attached.

78. The new Government was installed in Mozambique on September 25, 1974. Mr. Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO's chief representative in Dar es Salaam and the Movement No. 3 man was sworn in as Prime Minister and Admiral Victor Crespo took over the functions of Portuguese High Commissioner. For statements on Investiture ceremony, see Decolonization, Vol. I No. 2, October 1974, OPI, New York.

you might comment on why Chissano.

At this juncture, perhaps the following observations with regard to the Lusaka Accords may be pertinent. It would appear that FRELIMO literally got every thing it bargained for. It rejected the idea of referendum and this was accepted by the Portuguese. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Agreement does not even provide for elections before independence. In the course of the negotiations - between the first and second Lusaka Meetings, Portugal while dropping the idea of a referendum was selling the proposal of elections to be held jointly under the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and Portugal and possibly with UN observers. Perhaps Portugal's recognition of FRELIMO's overwhelming support by the Mozambicans led the Portuguese Government not to press ~~on~~ this demand.⁷⁹ While it is arguable whether or not FRELIMO would have accepted the proposals of elections, this writer believes that it would not have been impossible for the liberation movement to have gone along with the proposal provided FRELIMO was satisfied that there would be no tricks.

Throughout the negotiations, FRELIMO had been ~~very~~ flexible *as were the Portuguese* on the question of time span as far as the transfer of power was concerned. FRELIMO's demand was that there should be firstly, an acceptance in principle of the transfer of power to FRELIMO and secondly, the agreement on the mechanism outlining the modalities for that transfer. FRELIMO had never demanded that the transfer

79. In a telegram dated September 2, 1974 from the FRELIMO President to the Chairman of the Committee of 24 urging the UN and the Committee of 24 to re-affirm that peace and justice can only be attained in Mozambique through the country's full independence and the transfer of power to FRELIMO, Mr. Samora Machel had inter alia asserted: "FRELIMO has the total adherence of the Mozambican people...(and) in Mozambique the Portuguese Army itself supports the position of FRELIMO". (emphasis added). A/AC.109/461, September 4, 1974, pp. 1-2.

should be total and immediate. One final observation; considering the provisions of the agreement, the implementation of which have already begun, it would be difficult to contradict Foreign Minister Soares when he asserted that the process of negotiations between the delegations of Portugal and FRELIMO ^{OK} ~~was~~ "carried out in a relatively short period of time, given the magnitude of the problems that were faced".⁸⁰

V

TOWARDS EFFECTIVE OR "FLAG" INDEPENDENCE

The success of the Lusaka negotiations and the developments after Lusaka, clearly point out that Mozambique will indeed be an independent nation on June 25 next year.⁸¹ As a step in that

80. Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1974. A/P.V.2239.

81. Some extremist elements among the settler community have tried to impede the decolonization process. The first challenge took place on the same day that the Lusaka Agreement was signed when a group of whites attempted to take over power. (New York Times, September 8, 1974). That "revolt" was crushed within three days. (New York Times, September 11, 1974). Two important observations merit attention in connection with this rebellion. First, the Portuguese authorities took prompt action to deal with it thereby demonstrating their determination to live to the letter and spirit of the Lusaka Accords. Second, in the process of putting an end to the rebellion, a degree of marked cooperation was displayed between the Portuguese armed forces and those of FRELIMO soldiers. The significance of such cooperation among former arch antagonists need not be overemphasized particularly when account is taken that this alliance was utilized to quell the resistance of the white settlers. While the extremist elements among the settlers are far from resigned to what they consider as an ominous development (the inevitability of FRELIMO led independent Mozambique), their capacity to make serious mischief is apparently limited. They neither have the resources nor the power like, for example, that possessed by the colons in Algeria. At the same time, FRELIMO seems to have made great successes in reassuring the bulk of the Portuguese population in Mozambique that they have a future and a role to play in the country. In other words, since the circumstances and situation of Mozambique is different from that which prevailed in Algeria, the settlers need not fear the "Algerianization" of the Mozambican whites.

Mention must also be made that the cooperation and co-existence between the FRELIMO and Portuguese armed forces has not been without untoward incidents. At least one of these resulted in a blood gun battle between Portuguese commandos and FRELIMO troops towards the end of October, 1974, causing more than 40 deaths and 150 injuries. But both the FRELIMO government and the Portuguese authorities dismissed the incident as a work of reactionary elements opposed to the new order.

direction, it was recently reported that FRELIMO government will take control of the country's internal security - hithertofore Portugal's responsibility - at the beginning of next year. According to the Portuguese High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Victor Crespo, the move is geared to make decolonization more effective.⁸²

What will an independent Mozambique mean to the ordinary Mozambican? What will it mean to the Southern African situation and thus to the efforts of the independent African States in the elimination of racism and colonialism in that part of the continent? Put differently, will the process of decolonization now unfolding in Mozambique stop at formal decolonization with the new elite satisfied with the trappings of power - national flag, national anthem, a seat at the United Nations and the mere substitution of Portuguese bureaucrats with the African ones? Or will the process forge ahead towards an effective decolonization? These are important and complex questions. It would be presumptuous to assert in categorical terms the type of society that is likely to emerge in the new Mozambique. For speculation and conjectures in the field of politics could often lead us astray. Yet, on the basis on the concrete situation prevailing in Mozambique, its strategic position in the area and the known position of FRELIMO as well as its performance, a number of ^{trends} ~~observations~~ are clearly discernible. It is to these factors that our analysis will now be focussed and our ^{conclusions drawn.} ~~assumptions made.~~

The ~~Great~~ West Indian revolutionary, Frantz Fanon in his celebrated works, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH, TOWARDS THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION, and BLACK SKINS WHITE MASKS has exposed the pitfalls of formal

82. REUTERS dispatch from Laurencio Marques dated November 27, 1974.

decolonization. In the first two afore-mentioned writings, Fanon has described how the move towards independence has been a ~~sort of~~ bargaining *MM* between the colonizers and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie among the colonized. Such a process preempted real and genuine independence since, on the one hand, it served to protect and entrench the interests of the erstwhile colonial power and, on the other hand, only a very tiny minority of the population - the bureaucratic bourgeoisie - reaped the benefits of "independence". It is not difficult to comprehend why the privileged elite of the colonies should be willing "partners" or stooges *if you like*, of the metropole. Fanon addressed himself succinctly to this problem. "The bourgeoisie in the colonies", wrote Fanon, "*is*, before independence, a western bourgeoisie, a true branch of the bourgeoisie of the mother country that derives its legitimacy, its force and its stability from the bourgeoisie of the homeland".⁸³

The resultant effect of the deal between the colonialists and their proteges in the colonies is that, *//* independence formalized heralds very little or nothing for the lot of the 'wretched' masses. The point to bear in mind in considering the Mozambican situation is that, Fanon's postulate is based on the assumption of the existence of a deal. We can *obviously* dismiss the "deal" theory as irrelevant to the Mozambican process of decolonization. FRELIMO fought for the liberation of Mozambique. The nature of the negotiations which we have already discussed in the previous chapter, clearly demonstrates that it was FRELIMO's military and political strength that above all

83. Frantz Fanon, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1966 p. 143.

While I agree with you the point should be stated in a more tentative way. In 1962 who would have expected Algeria to evolve as it did?

(The quote doesn't stand on its own without the lead-in phrase) - 36 -

determined the tempo and pace of Mozambique's decolonization process. By the same token, considering the nature of Mozambique's liberation struggle, we are inclined to accept the premise that FRELIMO will not be satisfied with "flag" independence. In this context, we find Mittleman's observations relevant: "Societies which experience wars of national liberation are generally ^{further} advanced towards effective decolonization when these accede to Statehood".⁸⁴ It is pertinent to point ^{out} ~~here~~ that Mozambique, ^{and} like Guinea Bissau, ^{are} ~~will~~ the only countries in the African continent that will have attained their independence as a result of ~~the of the~~ victory of their armed struggle since Algeria did so in 1962. ^{It is appropriate to add} ~~And for the purpose of accuracy, we can also~~ ^{perhaps add a footnote about Kenya} add that whereas the Algerian war of national liberation lasted for eight years (1954-1962), the armed resistance of the Mozambicans under the leadership of FRELIMO lasted a little more than ten years.

FRELIMO, both in its policies in those areas which it had liberated, and in the many utterances of its leaders unequivocally project the determination to attain effective decolonization. Perhaps the most eloquent expose of this determination was made by FRELIMO's President in his message to the people of Mozambique on the occasion of the investiture ceremony of the FRELIMO-led Transitional Government. Explaining on the imperative need to achieve real decolonization and building up of the necessary structure for the achievement of what he termed "People's Democratic Power" in Mozambique, Samora Machel declared:

"Decolonization does not mean the geographical transfer of the decision-making centres from Lisbon to Lourenco Marques, which the deposed regime was in fact already

84. James Mittleman, op.cit., p. 5.

I would state the argument more carefully. Something to the effect: "While it is important to distinguish verbal from non-verbal behavior, the earliest indications in Mozambique are"
Let your reader know that you are not relaying rhetoric.

proposing to do, and neither is it the continuation of the oppressive regime, this time with black-skinned rulers, which is the neo-colonial pattern.

"To decolonize the State means essentially to dismantle the political, administrative, cultural, financial, economic, educational, juridical and other systems which, as an integral part of the colonial state, were solely designed to impose foreign domination and the will of the exploiters on the masses".⁸⁵

From the above statement, we can clearly detect the determination (at least *in terms of the initial intentions* ~~theoretically speaking~~) of the overhauling of the new Mozambique, in which foreign domination will be resisted, and opportunity denied to those black-skinned Africans with white masks.

Furthermore, FRELIMO aims at removing the imperialist relations of dependency. To quote Samora again: "We inherited a colonial economic structure in which the productive factors did not serve our country or our people, but foreign domination. We must combat this situation by laying the foundations of an independent economy to serve the working masses".⁸⁶

FRELIMO's determination to create an independent economy is perceived in the context of unleashing the productive efforts of the working masses "within a system of social organization which fights exploitation".⁸⁷ Nonetheless, since the liberation movement has yet to declare in unequivocal terms its commitment to build a socialist society, some of the contemporary Marxist writers may still be awaiting for such a commitment to sustain FRELIMO's goal of eliminating dependence relations. For according to such writers like Magdoff, "the primary task of the peoples of the third world, as they struggle to throw off the shackles of imperialism and to achieve a humanitarian

85. DECOLONIZATION, Vol. I, No. 2, October 1974, p. 8.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

economic development is the abolition of the capitalist system itself, with all that it implies with respect to wage relationships. This is an absolutely necessary condition for entrance to independence and development".⁸⁸

To aim at an independent economy and to achieve that objective are obviously two different things. The independent government of Mozambique will be faced with a number of hard facts. ~~The~~ ^{Five} centuries of Portuguese colonialism have resulted in such social ills as widespread illiteracy, poverty, ignorance, starvation and disease, to say nothing of the thousands of disabled Mozambicans, orphans and the like - victims of the repressive colonial war. FRELIMO will therefore inherit a serious and difficult economic, financial and cultural situation.⁸⁹

To begin with, the FRELIMO government will inherit a colonial economy which has been bedevilled with a chronic deficit in its balance of payments brought about by high import demands as well as the vagaries of the ten years of the colonial war.⁹⁰

The country's dominant dependence on agricultural products for its foreign trade is another factor. According to 1972 statistics, these commodities - mainly cashew, cotton and sugar accounted for 65% of Mozambique's total exports.⁹¹ Notwithstanding the recent gains made by some of the developing countries in the international economic relations, the fate of primary products - the nature of which Mozambique is dependent - still leaves a lot to be desired. *vague!*

88. Harry Magdoff's "Foreword" in Jalee's IMPERIALISM IN THE SEVENTIES, the Third Press, New York, 1973, p. xxi.

89. DECOLONIZATION, op.cit., p. 5.

90. A/AC.109/919, p. 24.

91. Ibid, p. 24

But, perhaps the immediate challenge to an emergent Mozambique would be to disentangle itself from the linkages of dependency that the combined factors of colonialism and geography have subjected her to vis-a-vis her white minority dominated neighbours - South Africa and Rhodesia. For Mozambique's dependence on these two countries, and more particularly South Africa, is self evident. South Africa takes a second place after Portugal among Mozambique's major trading partners.⁹² And through the port and railway transit facilities rendered to the apartheid state as well as to Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique acquires one of her major sources of revenue.⁹³ This then brings us to some aspects of third party interests in the Mozambique decolonization process.

The South African and Rhodesian Connections

South Africa's interests in Mozambique are substantial and they are economic as well as strategic. The Republic has an important railway links with Laurencio Marques. Mozambique's excellent harbours of Laurencio Marques and Beira are important ports used by some of South Africa's exports and imports requirements and thus providing a substantial amount of income to Mozambique. It is estimated that in 1972, harbours and railways provided for Mozambique about 100 million Rands (one Rand equals approximately US \$1.50) in foreign exchange through facilities extended to some of Mozambique's neighbours, namely, Malawi, Rhodesia, Swaziland, South Africa and Zambia. Significantly, however, South Africa's contribution is estimated at 50 million Rands.⁹⁴

92. Ibid, p. 24.

93. Ibid, p. 27

94. Teigue Payne, "FRELIMO cannot afford to cut S.A. links", the Johannesburg Star, October 26, 1974.

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Then there is the Mozambican labour force contribution to the South African mines. In accordance with a Labour Contract, Mozambique supplies more than 100,000 workers annually. In 1972, about 115,800 Mozambican workers in the South African mining industry earned about 45 million Rands. *reword* up to 60% of the workers' earnings had been compulsorily deferred pay remittances to the Portuguese Government. It is estimated that by this process, about 20 million Rands were transferred to the Portuguese Government coffers at the official price of gold.⁹⁵ South Africa's contribution to the territory's tourist industry is also substantial. Thus, of the 167,000 tourists that visited Mozambique in 1972, about 59% were from *South Africa* ~~the land of apartheid~~.⁹⁶

One of the most important economic projects in Mozambique is the Cabora Bassa Dam.⁹⁷ In 1971, Portugal allocated 530 million escudos to finance the dam. (27 Escudos equal approximately US \$1.00). In 1972, the amount allocated was 379.4 million escudos⁹⁸ and it is estimated that for 1973 an amount of 500 million escudos were spent for the project. But Portugal's contribution to the costs of Cabora Bassa is only one-tenth. South Africa's investment in the project is two-thirds, while 25 per cent contribution is from the international

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid. According to the same source, the earnings from the tourist industry during that year was estimated at 20-40 million Rands.

97. The 8,787.3 million escudos mammoth Hydro-electric project is under construction by the Zambo-Zambezi Consorcio Hydro-electric, Lda. This multinational consortium was awarded the contract in 1969. For the most recent details of the project, See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8723/Rev.1), Chapter V, annex, appendix II, paragraphs 69 et seq.; *ibid.*, Twenty-eight session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), Chapter IV, annex, appendix II paragraphs 13 et seq.

consortium.⁹⁹ The Dam's first power station, which is expected to have an annual 2 million kwh of electricity is reported to have been completed early this year. The completed part of the project includes the power transmission lines to South Africa, each 880 kilometers long.¹⁰⁰

The strategic significance¹⁰¹ of Mozambique to South Africa is not difficult to discern. To have ⁱⁿ "hostile" neighbour right on the border will obviously increase South Africa's security problems. A nationalist and militant African regime with avowed solidarity with the liberation movement in South Africa itself will help in the intensification of the political agitation among the non-white population in South Africa. And taking into consideration the possibilities of infiltration by Liberation movement's guerillas through the frontier which will be much more difficult to adequately patrol, South Africa's disquiet can clearly be perceived.

The question is whether Mozambique under FRELIMO will continue without interruption the South African ^{new} ~~connection~~. If she does, what would become of the principles which the organizations had steadfastly proclaimed? If she does not, would the ^{new} ~~infant~~ nation be able to

99. Payne, op.cit.

100. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS, Supplementary Working Paper prepared by the UN Secretariat. Restricted Conference Room Paper SCI/74/4, May 7, 1974, p. 5.

101. The strategic significance of Mozambique is also viewed in the context of great power rivalry by some western military planners particularly the United States. The argument goes that the weakening of the flanks of South Africa constitutes a danger to the overall anti-Soviet global strategy of the United States. Neil Bruce in his "Portugal's African Wars", puts the western argument in the following terms: "With the build-up of the Soviet navy in the Atlantic and especially in the Indian Ocean, the west cannot ignore the vital strategic importance of Portugal's East African and Atlantic possessions, with its excellent harbours and Airfields down the Mozambique coast to South Africa:..." Neil Bruce, op.cit., p. 2.

overcome the serious economic dislocation attendant to a dramatic disengagement from South Africa? From a short term point of view, the problem can be conceived in terms of what should come first, principles or bread and butter?

According to the South African Prime Minister Mr. Voster, South Africa had received assurances (from FRELIMO?) that the harbours of Beira and Laurencio Marques will remain open and the railway line kept open for normal (South African and Rhodesian) traffic. Similar assurances have been given that the Mozambique Labour Agreement would remain in force and that electric power from the Cabora Bassa would reach South Africa. Mr. Voster is also reported to have stated that he asked for and received assurances that Mozambique would not be used as a launching pad for people wanting to "sabotage" South Africa.¹⁰²

Whether these assurances were in fact given; and if so whether they were given directly by FRELIMO or through third parties, one thing is obvious. FRELIMO would be naive to provoke a confrontation at a time when the process of legal decolonization is not even complete. It would also be unrealistic to expect FRELIMO to commit what can almost be tantamount to ~~an~~ economic suicide by deciding to terminate forthwith all links with South Africa in the wake of independence. The most likely course of action, ~~it is submitted~~, would be for a gradual discontinuance of the links. The Zambian example and experience would in this context be relevant. Indeed, it is submitted, that judging by FRELIMO's orientation, past policies and experience, the disengagement process is likely to be at the minimum slightly more

102. Excerpts from Prime Minister B. J. Voster's address at Nigel, South Africa on November 5, 1974 as reported by the South African Press Agency (SAPA), November 5, 1974.

radical compared to the Zambian model. At any rate, there is no doubt that some constraints are likely to be made however gradual the process. Such a line of action is inevitable if FRELIMO is to live to its declared goal of effective decolonization.

With respect to the position of the FRELIMO Government in the independent Mozambique on the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, it is fairly safe to assume that there is no question of FRELIMO's renunciation or abandonment of the same. It is, however, more than likely that FRELIMO would move with caution in this regard. The first responsibility of the FRELIMO government in an independent Mozambique is the consolidation of the country's independence. It would therefore be unnecessary adventurism for the government there to unduly provoke the racist regimes and thus give them the pretext for launching aggression under the guise of the so-called principles of "preemptive strike" or the so-called right of "hot-pursuit". Indeed, the greatest contribution that FRELIMO can make to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa is first and foremost, to maintain and safeguard its newly won independence. It is submitted that the Organization of African Unity and the international community will understand and sympathize with FRELIMO's position provided that there are definite signs of attempts at disengagement. And in this context, it must be stressed that though at the infant stage, Mozambique will face considerable economic problems, from the long term perspective, the country has a great potential of sustaining an independent economy. Among other things, Mozambique is not so poor in mineral resources. It has deposits of coal, copper, manganese, fluorite, chrome, nickel and vanadium.

role of multinationals?

It is likely to grant right of sanctuary to freedom fighters

reword positively

The Southern Rhodesia connection is comparatively less important for Mozambique though the country earns ~~something to the tune~~ ^{approximately} of \$25 million annually in revenue through the railway and harbour facilities utilized by the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

But unlike the South African link which makes Mozambique the greater beneficiary economically speaking, the Rhodesia connection is by far more crucial for Rhodesia.

Rhodesia is particularly dependent on the 250 kilometers of the Umtali-Beira railway. Closure of this railway link will force Rhodesia to use the much longer and more expensive route of Bulawayo - Port Elizabeth and Capetown. Furthermore, Mozambique is an important outlet for the rebel regime's sanction busting exercise. For this very reason, there would seem to be greater urgency to do something to the Rhodesia rather than the South African connection.

Another area of serious concern to the white minority authorities in Rhodesia is the possible use of Mozambique by the ZAPU and ZANU guerilla units to launch their attacks against the Smith regime's armed forces. It is relevant to point out that on a number of occasions, the Zimbabwe liberation movement fighters have used the sanctuaries provided by the FRELIMO liberated areas in Mozambique to carry out their war operations in Rhodesia. If therefore, there is to be a toughening up of position on the part of the new government in Mozambique as regards the Southern Africa confrontation, the Rhodesian connection will be the first casualty. yes

VI

CONCLUSION

The process of decolonization in the Portuguese dominated

territories has now taken a ~~definite~~ and irreversible turn. Guinea Bissau is already a member of the United Nations and a transitional government is in the making in the Islands of Cape Verde which would be a prelude to the Islands' independence in the very near future. Mozambique is to emerge ^{as} into a new sovereign nation on June 25, 1975. The ~~little~~ Islands of Sao Tome and Principe are expected to be an independent state on July 12, 1975. And Angola, notwithstanding its complexities - its immense riches being one of them - should, given the possibility of some reconciliation and concerted action among the territory's divided liberation movements, and bearing Reward unforeseen circumstances, proceed to independence towards the end of next year or at the beginning of 1976 at the very latest.

These are momentous developments by any standard. But judging by the history of recalcitrancy ~~of~~ the Caetano dictatorship, the march towards decolonization of the Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa constitute an event of spectacular historic dimensions.

In this inquiry, we have seen that three factors have been primarily responsible for the unfolding events. First, the struggle of the national liberation movements who have had to wage armed resistance for more than ten years, ~~and containing the massive deployment of Portuguese armed forces, constantly harassing and demoralizing the enemy.~~ Second, the combined efforts of the international community in supporting the legitimate struggle of the colonial ~~peoples~~ and their national liberation movements. Such collective moves towards decolonization have been particularly evident in the United Nations ^{NGOs} and its family of organizations. Third, the internal resistance made by the Portuguese people against the Caetano regime through the young

→ Earlier on perhaps you want to mention humanitarian aid from certain governments - e.g., the Nordic countries

officers of the Movement of the Armed Forces, as well as the combined resistance struggles waged by the forces of the left - the socialists and communists playing the leading role. The April 25th coup, emerging ~~as it did~~ as a result of dissatisfaction with Portugal's colonial war-effort, was to be of ~~great consequential~~ ^{unprecedented} importance. The coup ultimately brought into the forefront those forces within the Portuguese ruling elite that favoured total decolonization and thus making the decolonization process take its course without undue procrastination.

The developments in Mozambique epitomize in an important way the process of Portuguese decolonization in Africa. The events there demonstrate, on the one hand, the ~~definite~~ ^{relentless} march towards formal independence. On the other hand, they show that the liberation movement aims at the achievement of effective and not mere formal or legal independence. Mozambican decolonization also elucidates that the experiences of the armed struggle provide an important basis for the march towards effective decolonization.

The end of Portuguese colonialism in Africa will usher a new era of hope in the continent and in particular in Southern Africa. But, the expected changes are not without their challenges - some of which are serious. The Mozambican situation amply demonstrates the complexities and problems of not only the centuries of colonial misrule. They also show the problems of inheriting a colonial economy and institutional structures of ~~self-perpetuating~~ ^{for maintaining} dependency relations. Mozambique's links with South Africa and to a lesser extent Southern Rhodesia, are going to prove a very sore point for the new leaders in Mozambique.

In the light of this, an independent Mozambique under FRELIMO's

leadership is bound to move with calculated circumspection vis-a-vis its white minority dominated neighbours, with its quest for consolidation of its independence and forging ahead towards genuine decolonization.

The ~~I~~nternational ~~C~~ommunity which has played an important role in the decolonization process of Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies in Africa, has a greater role to play in assisting these soon to be independent nations achieve viable economic and social development. And since the World Community has more or less declared war on the minority regimes in Southern Africa, it has the particular responsibility to effectively assist the new States in the process of disengagement from those links. Every effort must be made, all possible assistance given, to increase their options.

Clearly, whatever the problems and shortcomings, a new important chapter is being written in the history of decolonization. Briefly put, with the decolonization of the Portuguese dominated territories in Africa, things will never be the same again in Southern Africa.